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Abstract
The Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) faces an immediate financial crisis and a long-term
struggle to maintain its role as a meaningful transportation provider in Chicago. Political and
financial constraints will induce significant ridership losses in the near term unless additional
operating funds are made available. Moreover, even if funding for current fares and service
levels is maintained, the CTA risks a continuing decline in market share unless additional action
is taken.
This thesis investigates the costs and benefits of increased funding for the Chicago Transit
Authority under various scenarios. First, it examines historical and political factors that have
created the current tenuous environment for public transportation in Chicago. Then, it
establishes a framework for assessing the potential effects of increased funding. A distinction is
emphasized between measures that are internal to the agency, such as cost-effectiveness, and
external measures of benefit to riders and the region. A simplified, strategic cost-benefit
framework is outlined, focusing on three major benefit categories that drive political decision-
making: transit rider mobility (or generalized cost), congestion mitigation, and regional air
quality.
Examination of the likely near-term effects of the financial crisis shows that additional funding
is clearly justified in order to avoid the projected fare increases and ridership losses, even when
the costs of public funding are included. However, achieving additional ridership growth
through endogenous agency action is more difficult. It could be achieved through fare
reductions, but political constraints make such a move unlikely. A straightforward expansion
of service, even if targeted at buses and more responsive off-peak ridership, is at or slightly
below break-even with respect to net benefits if the CTA cost structure and tax source of
subsidy remains unchanged. In order to justify any significant additional long-term funding for
the purpose of growing ridership, the CTA should make operational changes to lower its costs
and should seek additional funding from sources with lower societal costs.
Thesis Supervisor: Frederick P. Salvucci
Title: Senior Lecturer, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering
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1 Introduction: Thesis Problem and Overview
The Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) faces an immediate financial crisis and a long-term
struggle to maintain its role as a meaningful transportation provider in Chicago. Some of the
origins of this tenuous position are deeply historical, but present-day political and financial
constraints are also major causal factors. These constraints will induce significant ridership
losses in the near term unless additional public operating funds are made available. Moreover,
even if funding for current fares and service levels is maintained, the CTA risks a continuing
decline in market share unless additional action is taken. This thesis will evaluate the likely
impacts of various future funding scenarios for the CTA and make strategic policy
recommendations based on that analysis.
1.1 The Problem
To a degree exceeded in the U.S. only in metropolitan New York, the Regional
Transportation Authority of northeastern Illinois (including CTA, Metra commuter rail, and
Pace suburban bus) is a significant provider of mobility and accessibility in the Chicago region.
For low-income and disadvantaged households, transit (especially the CTA) provides basic
transportation, but it also provides congestion mitigation, air quality, and option value benefits
that accrue to citizens across the metro area. More than 20% of workers in Cook County (the
central county in the Chicago metro area) use transit for their commute, and nearly 1.5 million
daily rides are carried on CTA trains and buses on an average workday.
Despite this important role, the CTA has faced funding and ridership crises throughout its
postwar history, and it faces another in 2005-06. Because of slow sales tax revenue growth and
increasing costs, the CTA (according to internal projections) faces an unfunded operating deficit
of almost $50 million in 2005. This deficit exists despite the fact that the CTA increased its base
fare from $1.50 to $1.75 at the end of 2003 to avoid a financial crunch. While this increase was
unfortunate for riders, it was not inconsistent considering inflation and base fares at peer
agencies. Yet the CTA still faces an operational crisis, and if the current funding structure
remains unchanged, additional significant fare increases and/or cuts in service will be required
in order to meet the RTA's fare recovery ratio requirement.
This crisis is not occurring because of a deterioration in operating performance. The CTA's
operating efficiency and service effectiveness have been steady and comparable to peer agencies
since 1996 and ridership has increased modestly. Instead, the crisis arises from overall public
13
funding that (a) is increasing at a rate below inflation and (b) is unrelated to ridership, and from
service requirements for paratransit added with no additional funding and no exemption from
the strict farebox recovery ratio.
It is instructive to consider the funding and ridership experience of the CTA over the past
quarter century under the oversight of the RTA (see Figure 1-1). Chicago was considered one of
the nation's "best" transit properties in the immediate postwar years. Yet the ridership losses in
Chicago have been especially heavy - more than 30% since 1979 - while national transit
ridership during the same period has been steadily increasing. From a low of 6.5 billion annual
trips in 1972, national transit ridership has increased by more than 50% to 9.7 billion trips in
2001.
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Figure 1-1: Total CTA Ridership and Federal Funding, 1978-2002
Striking changes in the provision of transit service by mode also occurred in Chicago during
this period. As funding became constrained and various financial crises hit the agency, service
reductions were often instituted. In almost all cases, these cutbacks were focused on the bus
network, the carrier of the majority of Chicago's transit patrons. Figure 1-2 shows ridership and
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revenue vehicle miles separately for motorbus and rail rapid transit across the same period.
Rail transit actually showed a net growth in revenue service over the period, as the Orange Line
was opened in 1993 and improvements in efficiency (especially the move to one-person train
operation) allowed additional service provision for the same expenditure level. As a result,
ridership also held virtually constant over the period, dipping slightly during the worst years of
the early 1990s but recovering later in the decade. The bus experience is sharply different, as
both ridership and revenue service trended steadily downward until 1998 - revenue vehicle
miles were reduced by 18% and ridership fell by more than 45%.
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Figure 1-2: CTA Ridership and Revenue Miles, by Mode, 1978-2002
Many demographic and economic factors were certainly causally related to this drop - the
population loss to the suburbs was especially strong in Chicago during the period, and shifts in
employment and retail locations made the automobile relatively more attractive. However,
service reductions resulting from operational funding constraints must also be counted among
the causal factors. Real federal operational funding (in 2003 dollars), which had averaged over
$85 million annually from 1982-1986 (after peaking at almost $140 million in 1979) and was still
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as high as $50 million in 1994, was zeroed out during the late 1990s. Yet no changes were made
to the regional structural funding arrangement to account for this reduction. The CTA also was
not reimbursed for some discounted fares throughout the 1990s, and it faces a large and
growing financial burden from providing paratransit service to the disabled (estimated at $45
million for 2004). Though we cannot reverse the past, Chicago's experience should serve as a
warning for the future regarding the effect of diminished funding on ridership.
And yet ridership in itself, while indicative, is not a complete measure. The ridership lost
during past crises was costly because:
o Many trips shifted to the auto, increasing regional roadway congestion and
decreasing air quality.
o Some trips were completely abandoned, destroying mobility for those travelers.
o Continuing transit riders suffered increased user costs (i.e., loss of consumer welfare)
as fares were increased and service was reduced.
o Transit's "option" value to infrequent riders was reduced as it became less
competitive with the auto.
This thesis will attempt to measure the costs and benefits associated with avoiding such
ridership loss during the upcoming years. Avoiding this loss will require additional public
funding. This thesis does not focus on the very real considerations of the source of this public
funding.' Instead, we are interested in the costs and benefits of addressing the crisis - how
different levels of funding will achieve different outcomes.
1.2 Thesis Overview
1.2.1 Background
In Chapter Two, we provide an in-depth discussion the evolution of surface transportation
in Chicago and of the problems facing the CTA. These problems have both historical origins
(rooted in divergent public policies towards mass transportation and the private automobile)
and current causes (the structural allocation of regional transit funding). This chapter will help
to take the cost/benefit analysis out of the abstract and ground it in the particular realities of
metropolitan Chicago.
1 Readers interested in this question should refer to the 2004 MIT masters' thesis of Julie Kirschbaum,
"Show Me The Money: Paying For Transit Operations At The Chicago Transit Authority."
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1.2.2 Framework
In Chapter Three, we create a framework for assessing the potential investments and
expenditures to address the problems. As part of this evaluation framework, we consider both
internal and external measures of transit performance. Literature on both performance aspects
is reviewed, and we compare the recent performance of the CTA with three of its peer U.S.
transit agencies (in Boston, Houston, and Washington, DC). Finally, we review various
approaches taken toward benefit/cost analysis in the literature and by government agencies at
both the state and federal level, and we describe the major benefit areas we will consider in the
analysis.
1.2.3 Baseline
In assessing the impact of the immediate financial crisis on the region, we must first
examine the costs of doing nothing. Chapter Four examines the prior experience of the CTA
when forced to implement fare increases, which have generally had a highly negative impact on
ridership despite raising overall revenue. We then evaluate the estimated additional subsidy
requirements to maintain ridership against the mobility, congestion, and air quality losses that
are likely to occur if that subsidy is not available.
1.2.4 Ridership Generation
Having established a justification for raising baseline funding for the CTA in order to
maintain ridership, in Chapter Five we consider further investments and expenditures aimed at
increasing ridership. We examine three potential policy objectives: holding congestion levels
constant by diverting regional vehicle miles traveled (VMT) growth into transit; reducing
household automobile expenditures; and recapturing previous levels of ridership. Using a
strategic-level cost model, we evaluate simplified one-period costs of achieving these goals and
also identify constraints on the CTA that prevent particular objectives from being realized. We
also examine the possibility of increasing ridership from fare reduction and differentiation.
1.2.5 Evaluation Over Time
The one-period cost model of the previous chapter tells only part of the story. In Chapter
Six, we evaluate the multi-period benefits and costs of adding ridership in an attempt to answer
whether it is worth it to achieve greater levels of ridership through endogenous actions by the
transit agency. There are clearly benefits that accrue from increased ridership, though the net
17
benefits of a straightforward expansion of current service patterns appear to be at or slightly
below the breakeven point. We then examine possibilities for altering the operating
environment in order to make the investments and expenditures more effective.
1.2.6 Recommendations and Future Research
In the final chapter, we assess the lessons learned from the previous analyses, make policy
recommendations for the CTA based on those results, and outline future research topics that
build on this thesis.
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2 Background: The Public Transit Environment
Urban mass transportation in the United States is overwhelmingly a publicly-provided
good. In this chapter, the causes and implications of this situation are examined more closely,
first with a brief look at national transit trends and then with a specific focus on the historical
evolution of public transit in Chicago. From this examination, three themes emerge which will
shape the analysis in the rest of the thesis:
A. The relative shares of mass transit and the private automobile for surface passenger trips
have never been, and likely never will be, determined purely by market forces. The
actions of government, from traffic laws to tax structures, place constraints on the
transportation system, which in turn have dictated outcomes. It is proper to examine
how these policy and funding constraints might be shifted to obtain different outcomes.
It is especially appropriate given the uncompensated externalities - notably congestion
and air pollution - associated with motor vehicle usage.
B. Metropolitan areas across the country continue to experience increases in vehicle miles
traveled and rush-hour congestion. This congestion is costly not only for travelers (lost
time and excess fuel), but also for surface freight carriers. Especially in major metro
areas, public transit plays a significant role in mitigating these losses.
C. Regional decision-making with regard to public transit has many positive features, but it
can sometimes lead to perverse outcomes. The costs and benefits of "buying back"
additional transit trips will depend heavily on what kind of additional service is
purchased and on what funding constraints exist for the agency.
2.1 Public Transit in the U.S.: A Brief Overview
The second half of the 1990s was a period of modestly strong growth for public transit in the
United States, a turnaround after decades of slumping ridership and declining finances. Transit
ridership peaked in the immediate postwar years with over 23 billion trips in 1946 (when the
national population was only 140 million), but the steady advance of the automobile and the
significant movement of households and jobs into lower-density suburbs decimated many
transit providers. A vicious cycle began, where increasing road congestion induced many
employers and households to decentralize further, which both hurt transit and ultimately
contributed to more congestion. Local and state governments were forced to take over these
companies and support them with public funds in order to guarantee some continuation of
19
service. Yet local public funding could not halt the decline, and the federal government joined
in supporting transit through the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 and subsequent
legislation. 2
The low point for transit ridership came in 1972, when only 6.6 billion trips were recorded,
an absolute drop of over 70% from the postwar high and an even greater fall-off in per-capita
terms. During the 1970s, ridership did improve as significant capital funds were expended on
transit, especially on new heavy rail systems in cities like San Francisco and Washington, DC.
By 1985, total transit ridership stood at 8.4 billion annual trips. For the next ten years, however,
federal spending for capital and operating support fell in real terms, and the ridership trend
returned to negative, with a billion annual trips lost in that period. But the combination of a
resurgent national economy and improvement in public support (through the ISTEA and TEA-
21 federal authorization bills) gave transit a strong push in the late 1990s. By 2001, steady
growth had lifted total transit ridership to 9.0 billion rides, an increase of 20% over 1995.
Gross ridership numbers do not tell the entire story, of course, since ridership increases can
result from both extended service on the supply side and increased intensity of use on the
demand side. In the ten years from 1991 to 2001, total vehicle revenue miles (VRM) by transit
vehicles increased by one-third, from 2.5 billion to 3.3 billion. This increase was not spread
equally across all modes. Buses, which provide the majority of transit service in the U.S., saw
VRM increase 17%, and nearly all of that increase has been since 1996. Heavy rail VRM was
also up 17%, though the growth was more gradual across the period. Modes such as light rail,
vanpool, and demand responsive (paratransit) service saw much higher percentage increases,
though on a smaller base of riders. Thus, it is clear that intensity of use for transit has actually
fallen substantially over the last ten years. Considered across all modes, ridership from 1991-
2001 increased by 16%, but total vehicle revenue hours (VRH) increased by 34%, essentially the
same as VRM. This corresponds to a decline of 13% in ridership per VRH, which is a worrying
trend. When considered specifically by mode, the picture is only slightly brighter. Bus, heavy
rail, and commuter rail all declined between 5% and 10% in ridership per VRH during those
years.3
2 See, for example, the American Public Transportation Association's (APTA) history of public transit for
additional information (htap:/ /www.apta.com/research/stats/history /mileston.cfn).
3 Comprehensive data on revenue seat miles, which would give a clearer picture of total transit capacity
being supplied, are not readily available. In its annual conditions and performance report, the Federal
Highway Administration (FHWA) calculates a measure of transit utilization for each mode: the ratio of
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Public transit agencies must be concerned not only with the usage of transit, but also the
cost of providing it. Transit is heavily labor-intensive, with salaries, wages, and fringe benefits
accounting for 80% of the operational spending on transit in the U.S. For a number of reasons,
including the strength of labor unions in local politics and the labor protection provisions of the
Urban Mass Transportation Act, transit labor expenses have been especially burdensome in the
post-war period. However, the operating expenses for public transit have been moderated
somewhat in the previous ten years, as operating expense per unlinked trip has grown at just
below the rate of inflation. It is also instructive to compare per-trip operating costs for various
modes. As of 2001, the average passenger trip on heavy rail in the U.S. required $1.50 in
operating expenses, and the average bus trip cost $2.30. By comparison, commuter rail service -
which saw significant expansion in many cities during the 1990s - cost $6.80 per passenger trip,
though trips on commuter rail are generally longer than bus or heavy rail trips. Of course, these
national averages obscure many differences between and even within transit agencies, and
these differences affect the ease with which an agency might begin to "buy back" trips. 4
Despite the recent positive signs of increases in transit ridership and slower growth in
operating expenses per passenger trip, a larger concern exists for public transit - an increasing
marginalization compared to the private automobile. Considering both cost per trip and service
frequency, mass transit has always been most effective in serving radially-oriented trips and
trips during high-volume times of day. In practice, this has meant focusing most service on
peak-hour commuting trips, and the overwhelming dominance of the private auto for non-work
trips by choice riders is not surprising. Yet the journey-to-work data from the United States
Census shows that transit has steadily lost market share even for commuting trips. In 1960,
public transit accounted for 12.6% of all trips to work, while private vehicles had 69.5% of the
commuting market. By 2000, the auto accounted for 87.9% of work trips while transit captured
vehicles operated in maximum service to total passenger miles, adjusted by a "capacity factor" that is not
given. This measure shows heavy rail utilization rising slightly from 1987-2000 and bus utilization falling
slightly. There are a number of problems with this approach; most notably, it ignores any changes in off-
peak service provision. More information is available in Chapter 4 of the 2002 Conditions and Performance
Report, FHWA, http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/2002cpr/.
4The growth in demand responsive services has been especially costly to agencies. Total demand
responsive ridership has grown 50% from 1990 to 2002 (from 68 million to 103 million), and these trips
had an average operating cost per trip of $18.90 in 2002 while only receiving an average fare per trip of
$1.87 (APTA Statistics). This service, mandated by the federal Americans with Disabilities Act but
unsupported by federal funds, is an increasing burden on transit agencies.
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only 4.7%. Indeed, the number of workers commuting by transit was flat between 1990 and
2000 (6.1 million), but the total number of workers increased by over 13 million.
A simple overview of national transit trends, however, is insufficient to illuminate either the
more specific causes of transit's problems or the possibilities for its revival. As an introduction
to the case study, a more comprehensive review of surface transportation's development in
Chicago is presented.
2.2 The Evolution of Surface Transportation in Chicago
The evolution of surface transportation in Chicago serves as a useful encapsulation of
transit's development in the United States. Chicago occupies a middle ground of sorts - unlike
most large western and southern cities, its period of greatest growth was in the pre-automotive
era, but it has a physical expansiveness not shared by older east coast cities. Of course, a
number of the historical details are necessarily specific to Chicago, but the larger lessons are
broadly applicable.
2.2.1 A City Built on Transportation
The city of Chicago covers an area of nearly 230 square miles in the northeastern corner of
Illinois, directly west of Lake Michigan. As of the 2000 Census, nearly 2.9 million people called
Chicago home, a four percent increase over 1990 which halted decades of population loss
following World War II.5 The metropolitan area spreads much further - the nine-county
Chicago PMSA covers 5,065 square miles and has approximately 8.3 million residents, an
increase of over eleven percent since 1990.6 Chicago currently stands as the third largest metro
area in the United States, behind New York and Los Angeles.
Chicago's history is intimately tied to transportation. From its beginnings as a portage
between Lake Michigan and the Mississippi River to its present position as a national hub for
railroads and airlines, the movement of people and goods has been key to the growth of the
city. As new transportation technologies have been developed, and as the funding and
operation of transportation systems has evolved, Chicago has transformed along with them.
5 Chicago's population peaked in 1950 at 3.6 million and fell steadily thereafter despite the strong
population growth in the overall metropolitan area. Between 1970 and 1990 alone, the population of the
city of Chicago dropped by nearly 600,000 people.
6 The six largest counties in the PMSA, which are closest to Chicago and constitute the area under the
jurisdiction of the Regional Transportation Authority (RTA), are Cook, DuPage, Lake, Will, Kane, and
McHenry Counties. The three other counties (Grundy, DeKalb, and Kendall Counties) are outlying and
contain only 2% of the metropolitan area population.
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Chicago grew to national prominence in the pre-automotive age, when railroads hauled the
majority of the nation's freight and a system of privately owned streetcars and elevated
railways moved travelers throughout the city. The basic form of the city was created in this
period. Yet as the automobile gained market share in the 1920s and 30s, as interstate
expressways into and around the city were built following World War II, and as zoning was
changed to reduce densities and separate land uses, Chicago was altered as well. Both in the
city and in the new suburbs, individual trip-makers increasingly opted for the convenience of
the private automobile, while freight movers found the flexibility of trucking indispensable.
Now, at the beginning of the 21st century, a combination of private choices and public
investments has created a dilemma. Mass transit, although reduced since its heyday, still plays
a vital role in providing mobility and accessibility in Chicago, especially for the young, old, and
disadvantaged, and it has the potential to do more. Trucking continues to grow, and the yard-
to-yard movements that are a key determinant of the success of Chicago's intermodal shipping
business are a focus of great commercial interest. Yet current public choices in the allocation of
financial and physical resources, which in turn influence private investment and consumption
decisions, continue to focus on the mobility of the private automobile at the expense of these
other modes. And still the congestion on highways and principal arterials continues to worsen.
2.2.2 The Pre-Automotive Era
The land at the southwest corner of Lake Michigan was home for centuries to Native
American tribes. But when the Treaty of Greenville in 1795 ceded a piece of land at the mouth
of a slow-moving river to the nascent United States, the creation of Chicago was set in motion.
The land was originally the site of Fort Dearborn, a garrison for the soldiers who protected the
traders and trappers of frontier America in the early 19th century. As the dangers waned and
the trading volumes grew, the need for a canal to connect Lake Michigan to the Mississippi
River became apparent. As explained by Cronon, after rejecting an easier route via the Calumet
River, which would have benefited Indiana at the expense of Illinois, the "canal town" of
Chicago was platted in 1830 and formally incorporated in 1833. As work on the canal
continued and the population grew, the town became a city in 1837. By 1848, when the Illinois
& Michigan Canal was finally completed, Chicago was on the verge of tremendous growth.
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2.2.2.1 Trade And Urban Form
Even before the I&M Canal, farmers from the surrounding prairie found that the cheap
access to eastern cities via the Great Lakes meant better prices for their grain in Chicago than
elsewhere. They brought the grain to the city in horse-drawn wagons and sold it on the banks of
the river. Miller describes how, once the canal opened, creating a continuous water route
between New York and the Gulf of Mexico, Chicago became the central point for a much larger
universe of trade between the urban manufacturing centers of the East and the resource-rich
states and territories of the West and South.
Many other goods besides grain came into Chicago on the canal, including cotton, molasses,
and other southern commodities from far down the Mississippi. Water-borne freight also came
in from the north and east, and Great Lakes shipping was another key to Chicago's strength.
Lumber from Wisconsin, iron ore from Minnesota, and coal from Pennsylvania came into
Chicago's harbor, providing the raw materials for the growth of housing and industry. Grain
exchanges, mills, storage silos, and other industrial buildings filled the banks of the Chicago
River, creating the first iteration of the dense downtown area that still draws travelers and
freight today.
Ultimately, the canal and the lake boats were only setting the stage for the economic growth
that would come in the second half of the 19th century. Chicago's first railroad, the Chicago &
Galena, was started in 1848, just as the canal was completed. Less than a decade later, Chicago
possessed a 3,000-mile rail network, the largest in the world. Although they originally worked
in parallel, the speed and capacity of the rails, as well as their ability to reach directly into the
hinterlands, overwhelmed the water carriers. Goods could now be shipped to the East Coast in
days rather than weeks, and specialized equipment such as refrigerated cars allowed Chicago to
become the center of the country's beef and pork trade. Competing lines soon crisscrossed the
city in order to meet the demand.
Perhaps the most important of these lines for Chicago's growth was the Illinois Central (IC),
which covered the length of the state between Cairo (at the junction of the Mississippi and Ohio
rivers) and its two termini at Chicago and Galena. Its completion in 1856 had two notable
effects. First, it opened up downstate Illinois to farmers, creating another huge market for
Chicago. Second, it allowed shippers to bypass St. Louis, Chicago's principal competition for
trade and industry. St. Louis failed to respond effectively, and Chicago quickly surpassed its
rival to become the dominant Midwestern city.
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The effect of the Illinois Central and the other railroads on Chicago's urban form is striking.
As Miller notes, Chicago did not have to adjust to the railroads as older cities did. It simply
grew up with them. In some senses, this concurrent growth was quite negative. The railroads
took up vast tracts of valuable land, spoiled the city with air and noise pollution, and snarled
traffic and killed residents at hundreds of at-grade crossings. Yet without the railroads, the
development of Chicago's downtown core would have taken a different course. The competing
railroads that headed out of Chicago to the east built massive yards to the south of the small
central business district. These yards prevented a southward expansion of the downtown,
which was the only direction available since the river and the lake blocked the north, west, and
east. Unable to expand out, Chicago's already dense Loop expanded upwards, and the
American skyscraper was born.
The Illinois Central also helped shape the city's form in another particularly notable way.
Unable to enter the city to the west of downtown due to the presence of a rival, in 1852 the IC
sought access via the lakefront. Yet the canal commissioners who had supervised the sale of
land plots in 1836 had marked the lakefront property as being a "Public Ground - A Common
to Remain Forever Open, Clear, and Free of Any Buildings, or Other Obstruction Whatever."
This single phrase became the bedrock upon which the protection of Chicago's lakeshore was
built. The IC counted on gaining the access in exchange for building and maintaining
breakwaters that would protect the lakefront from storms. But the city ultimately granted the
IC access into downtown on a trestle in Lake Michigan.
This decision soon took on a greater significance. After the fire of 1871, the burnt remains of
the downtown were used as landfill between (and ultimately beyond) the shoreline and the
railroad tracks, and acres of new land in the heart of the city were created. When the Illinois
Central attempted to gain rights to this land for expanded rail operations, preservationists and
others fought back. After many decades of fighting in the courts and the legislature, the
prerogative of the city to keep its lakeshore open was upheld. This victory opened the way for
Daniel Burnham, and his Plan of 1909 laid out a unified approach for organizing and
beautifying the city that continues to influence decisions today.
2.2.2.2 Intra-City Freight
Like most cities of the 19t century, the bulk of Chicago's freight within the city was moved
with animal power. As the city grew in the years following the fire, the volume of both finished
goods and raw materials increased tremendously, and the horse-drawn heavy wagon was the
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standard mode for moving freight for decades until the adoption of the truck. The poor quality
of the city's roads, in combination with the feeding, watering, and manure removal required for
horses, made freight hauling difficult enough. But the heavy concentration of both
manufacturing and retail in central Chicago, which drew hundreds of thousands of people to
the area on foot and by transit, created congestion on a massive scale that threatened the city's
economic capability (see Mayer, for example, for a more complete description).
Chicago did possess a unique transportation asset, however, that mitigated some of that
congestion in the central business district. As described in detail by Moffat, from 1898 to 1902,
the newly formed Illinois Telephone & Telegraph Company dug tunnels under the streets of
downtown Chicago. These tunnels were ostensibly for new telephone lines, but the IT&T had a
hidden plan to provide intra-city freight service on small, electrified rail lines. The plan
eventually came to light, but a modified franchise was granted, and the Illinois Tunnel
Company began revenue service on its 45 miles of tunnels in the summer of 1906.
The tunnels of the ITC connected rail yards, warehouses, offices, and department stores
throughout downtown. The major source of revenue was coal, which supplied the energy for
most buildings in the city, but cinders, baggage, and mail were also carried under the streets,
and stores used it to ship small goods. Traffic was strong for many years, but a number of
factors led to its eventual decline and closing in 1959. As the city expanded, surface railroads
moved their yards farther away from the downtown, reducing the connective ability of the
tunnels. Trucking, with its flexibility and reduced need for transshipment, took much of the
business. And finally, the subway tunnels in the Loop were built during the 1930s and 40s with
little regard for the freight tunnels, forcing the closure of many key links. Yet the tunnels
remain a prime example of the value that can be realized from traffic segregation.
Outside of the downtown area, Chicago had another special transportation asset. Chicago's
unique geographic position meant that many railroads chose the city as a terminus. Yet much
freight still needed to travel through the city, which required laborious and time-consuming
switching from one carrier to another. The Belt Railway Company of Chicago was formed in
1882 to serve this need. Under the joint ownership of five of the major railroads of the era, a
system of rail tracks was constructed that linked all the major yards in the city, along with
manufacturing areas on the south side. This system of convenient linkages allowed easy
movement of freight and avoided the congestion of the city streets. In the early 20th century, the
Belt Railway expanded along with the city as the rail yards moved further from the urban
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center. The Belt Railway continues to serve the major rail terminals in Chicago, although in an
attenuated form, as much of the inter-yard movement has shifted to the congested city streets
via trucking.
2.2.2.3 The Movement of People
A singular feature of Chicago is its city street grid. Many cities have a partial or even
complete grid, but few can match the regularity and vast expanse of Chicago. The dominance
of the grid was born out of a combination of geography and economics, but its effect on the
movement of people continues to shape the city and hold potential today.
With the first plat of the area around the river mouth in 1830 by James Thompson, the
regular pattern for Chicago was set. It was easy to expand existing streets and boundaries
because the flat prairie land offered few interfering geographic features. The regularity of the
grid had a business advantage as well for Chicago. Rectangular lots were easy to survey and to
sell, and this was key for a rapidly growing city. Some social historians (see Miller, for
example) have criticized this growth pattern, deeming it beneficial only to the private
speculators who sold and re-sold "commodified" pieces of land without regard to urban form.
Yet its effect on transportation alone offers a partial response to that view.
When Chicago was young, it was a walking city, and development stayed close to the river
and the lakeshore. But the horse-drawn omnibus enlarged the area open to development, and
when rail tracks were put down on the heaviest routes, the city was further expanded. Thus, by
1871, just before the fire, Chicago's grid was both a hindrance to the city and a facilitator of its
growth. Only 88 of its 530 miles of streets were paved, and many of those were covered with
manure and rubbish. Yet the streets and the railways on them provided unprecedented access
to disparate parts of the Chicago area - the Union Stock Yards, Lincoln Park, and even the
village of Hyde Park.
Tremendous growth in the grid and the transit network followed the fire. At the time of the
World's Columbian Exposition in 1893, the city was crisscrossed with both electric and horse-
drawn street railways, cable cars, and the beginnings of an elevated railway network (a line
running south from downtown to Jackson Park, built to carry visitors to the Exposition). The
horse-drawn cars were on their way out, though, and the cable cars soon followed. Both were
replaced by continued extensions in the electric streetcar and elevated railways systems. At the
same time, improvements continued on the street system itself. By the turn of the century,
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Chicago had nearly 1,400 miles of paved streets that spanned the city at regular mile ("section
line") and half-mile intervals.
Despite the iconic stature of the 'el' in Chicago, and without denying its significant value in
providing accessibility, street-based modes have always carried the majority of transit traffic in
the city, and the rectangular nature of the streets provides one reason why. Electric streetcars
set the pattern, with routes on the section line streets and most of the half-mile streets and
diagonals. This arrangement ensured that not only were a large majority of citizens in Chicago
within walking distance of a streetcar route, but they also could make cross-town trips without
traveling through downtown. Thus, despite the crowding and congestion travelers had to
endure during a streetcar trip, the traffic on the lines continued to grow. In 1929, by which time
the competing franchises had been organized into a single Chicago Surface Lines, the city
boasted a system of nearly 1,000 miles that carried almost 890 million fares. But by then the
automobile had arrived, and the city had already entered a new era.
2.2.3 The Auto Revolution
The automobile's rise to dominance, both in Chicago and across the world, spans reasons of
economics, technology, public policy, and sociology, and a full treatment here is clearly
impossible. Yet Paul Barrett, in his excellent book "The Automobile and Urban Transit," gives
insight into the alternate approaches taken toward transit and the automobile in Chicago during
the first three decades of the 20th century, and his analysis helps to set the stage for
understanding the present and future of ground transportation in the city. In addition,
continuing advances in truck technology and the building of the interstate highway system
encouraged a massive shift from rail to trucking. While not devastating to Chicago, this shift
changed the needs and priorities of freight handling in the city.
2.2.3.1 Private And Public Responsibility
Mass transit in Chicago was, from its inception, conceived as a fundamentally private
operation. In the 19th century, the system was decidedly laissez faire - transit lines owned by
land speculators stretched into unsettled prairie in hopes of increasing land values, and
companies competed vigorously over the most heavily traveled corridors. By the early 20th
century, however, reaction against the crowded and disjointed system led to public action.
Although some pressed for municipal ownership of the transit network, its continuing
profitability (especially the streetcar lines) made that seem unnecessary to most. As described
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most fully by Barrett, Chicago opted instead for regulated private ownership in an attempt to
provide both acceptable service to riders and a reasonable return to transit investors. Long-
term franchises were granted by the city, the ability of the streetcar and elevated companies to
set fares was severely limited, and "rationalization" of service was encouraged.
While this compromise had some obvious benefits over unregulated competition and was
viewed as a progressive model for other cities, it ultimately limited the ability of mass transit to
respond to the growing competition of the private automobile. Strategic questions such as line
extensions, equipment maintenance and replacement, and transfer policies became deeply
politicized, and the battles took place between highly visible combatants. The desires of
downtown businesses, outlying neighborhood associations, and the transit company itself
might all be mutually exclusive, and some institutional paralysis was an unsurprising result.
The automobile, conversely, faced far fewer political demands. From the outset, and due in
part to Burnham's Plan and to a national "good roads" movement, it was deemed a basic role of
the city to improve and widen city streets. At the same time, regulation of the automobile was
much more difficult than regulation of transit or even freight haulers, due to the dispersed
ownership and usually high social standing of the early auto adopters. Finally, the simple
advantages of personal automobility for the traveler should not be minimized. The advances in
comfort, speed, and reliability, combined with zoning changes and accommodations that were
made to allow parking even in crowded areas, made the auto undeniably attractive.
The growth in auto ownership in Chicago was striking. In 1915, the ratio of people to cars
was sixty-one to one. Only five years later, the ratio had been halved, and by the onset of the
Depression in 1930, there were only eight residents per private car. Auto traffic in both the CBD
and the outer areas grew, and the transit lines found it increasingly difficult to compete. As
traffic congestion worsened, streetcar performance deteriorated and many passengers switched
to automobiles, beginning a vicious cycle that continues to plague street transit service. At the
same time, inflation collided with the resolute demand by citizens and their representatives for
a five-cent fare. The finances of the transit companies began to decline, and the quality of their
private infrastructure suffered, further depressing transit's competitiveness.
The arrival of depression and war dealt the final blow to the faltering and overcapitalized
private transit companies (see Cudahy and others). Chicago Rapid Transit (the now-unified
elevated railway company) was forced into receivership in 1932, and the Chicago Surface Lines
were also in receivership by the end of World War II. Despite their poor finances, however, the
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transit lines still provided valuable mobility and accessibility for Chicago, and the voters
responded by approving municipalization. The Chicago Transit Authority was formed in 1947
by the combination of the CRT and the CSL, and the Chicago Motor Coach Company (a still-
profitable bus operation that focused mainly on lakeshore routes) was added in 1952.
The CTA undertook a sizable "modernization program" in the 1950s and 60s (see Garfield at
www.chicago-l.org for an excellent summary). Railcars were upgraded, electric streetcars were
replaced with buses (reducing the required investment in right-of-way), underused elevated
railways were closed, and new transit tracks were laid in the medians of the city's expressways.
Despite these investments, however, transit continued to falter, as the city lost population to the
suburbs and the CTA, especially on its bus routes, lost riders to the automobile.
2.2.3.2 The Role Of The Streets
Some of the decline in mass transit's share of the ground transportation market was
unavoidable, and even desirable. The private auto was able to provide accessibility to an
expanding city and region in a way that mass transit could not match, even if not beset by
financial or political troubles. Another portion of the decline can be attributed to zoning
decisions and government subsidies for single-family home mortgages. Yet the dominance of
the auto came to be nearly overwhelming, and that outcome stems in part from explicit
transportation policy decisions regarding roads and their appropriate uses.
According to Barrett, the crucial decision (reiterated over time through court decisions) was
that no class of privately owned vehicles could have priority on city streets, thus foreclosing the
possibility of traffic segregation. Although private streetcars had the legal right-of-way on their
tracks, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the public had the right to use the entire street, and
in practice the streetcars were forced to accommodate other traffic. Teamster wagons were
particularly egregious users of the streetcar tracks, and the streetcars had little immediate
recourse. Eventually, a combination of traffic enforcement by mounted police officers and
agreements with major teamster organizations served to somewhat separate the wagons and
the streetcars. By that time, however, automobiles were making streetcar travel even more
difficult, and similar intervention was much more difficult.
Yet the policy of rejecting segregation of the public space was not applied equally. Three
distinct examples make this inequality clear:
A. The increasing speed of automobiles presented a danger to pedestrians who often
shared the road with the streetcars and wagons during crowded times of day. Limiting
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the speed of automobiles was both politically touchy and difficult to implement, though,
so the automobile was accommodated. Segregation of the public space was allowed,
and pedestrian travel was definitively limited to sidewalks and crosswalks.
B. A de facto segregation of the road network was permitted with regard to parking.
Enforcement of the thirty-minute parking limit during the midday in the Loop was poor,
and double-parking was common, which forced automobiles into conflicts with
streetcars. Small businesses tended to favor on-street parking, while many large
downtown businesses (with the support of the Chicago Association of Commerce)
backed a downtown parking ban to improve traffic flow. Yet this ban was not the
accommodation to pedestrians, transit, or freight that it might appear to be, for they also
pushed for municipally owned or non-profit garages to handle the increasing parking
demand. Ultimately, conflicting pressures prevented action, and on-street parking in
the Loop remained. Moreover, on-street parking became ubiquitous outside of the
downtown area, securing a vast chunk of public road space for a particular class of
vehicles.
C. Explicit traffic segregation was allowed on the boulevards of Chicago. These broad and
landscaped roads ringed the city and were closed to wagon, truck, and transit traffic
(though some buses were later allowed on them). The boulevards were under the
control of the Park District and were well funded by the city in post-Burnham Chicago,
and they made automobile travel increasingly attractive. With their higher speeds and
limited access, they also offered a vision of even larger roads that would soon appear in
Chicago, financed by state and federal dollars.
As automobile and truck traffic continued to grow in the 1920s and 30s, the need for better
regional connectivity became apparent, and a nationwide network of expressways was planned
by Roosevelt in 1939. This became the basis for the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, which
created the framework for constructing our 44,000-mile Interstate Highway system. The key
feature was the pay-as-you-go Trust Fund that offered 90% federal funding for building toll-free
highway links if states would fund the remaining 10% (see Weingrof).
Although the highways were originally intended to connect and bypass cities, the 1960s and
early 70s saw a number of interstate highways constructed directly in the urban cores of major
cities, and Chicago was no exception. During the mayoralty of Richard J. Daley, all of the major
expressways radiating from downtown Chicago (the Eisenhower, Kennedy, Stevenson, and
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Dan Ryan) were either completed or initiated. The Dan Ryan Expressway, heading south out of
downtown, was especially notable, with seven lanes of traffic in each direction. These urban
freeways have been widely criticized (see Cohen & Taylor, for example) for encouraging flight
to the suburbs, destroying existing neighborhoods, and reinforcing racial segregation in the city.
And despite their potential economic benefits, they have also become very congested, which
threatens the economic health of the city on multiple dimensions.
2.2.3.3 Trucking And Intermodalism
The construction of the interstate system was a particular boon to the trucking sector. As
the shipping of raw materials became less important to the economy, the production and
distribution of smaller manufactured goods took prominence. The flexibility and cost structure
of trucking made it an attractive alternative to the railroads for these types of products and
allowed truck carriers to be more competitive and customer-oriented. Road quality and
capacity were trucking's only serious impediments, and the interstate highway system solved
this problem. According to the Census Commodity Flow Survey, single-mode trucking alone
now handles over 70% of the goods shipped in the U.S. when measured by value.7
Yet freight rail service, unlike its passenger counterpart, is still a significant part of the
nationwide transportation network. The more recent growth in intermodal traffic has also
proved to be a boon to Chicago, which has become the nation's hub for intermodal shipping.
The Chicago Area Transportation Study (CATS) estimated that the freight industry employed
over 114,000 workers from northeastern Illinois in 1996.8 Yet there is a cost that comes with this
activity. As noted above, many of the loads need to be transferred from yard to yard, and
studies (e.g., Li et al., 2001) have found that over 15,000 daily truck trips are created from these
movements. These trucks both create and are impaired by roadway congestion, and continued
congestion threatens the growth of this important industry.
2.3 The Current Crisis for the CTA
Chicago has rebounded from its worst years of job and population loss. The goal for the city
now is continued growth, and a robust transportation system is a key to drawing residents and
7 If measured by tons or ton-miles, the share for trucking is lower, since rail tends to carry heavier,
commodity-type freight over longer distances (e.g., coal).
8 As quoted by the Center For Neighborhood Technology (www.cnt.org), 2002.
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businesses. But the surface transportation network that provides such economic and social
advantages to the city faces an uncertain future.
2.3.1.1 Can Transit Grow?
Despite its difficulties, transit still plays an important role in providing accessibility to
people living and working in Chicago. The 2000 Census found that more than 20% of workers
in the central county (Cook) use transit as their primary means of transportation to work, and in
the Chicago MSA the share is 11.5%, second only to New York. Perhaps more significantly, over
the five years from 1997 to 2002, the Chicago Transit Authority reversed trend and experienced
a minor resurgence in ridership, after decades of decline. Since 1997, total system ridership (in
unlinked trips) has increased 7.5%, although growth has recently stagnated along with the
national economic slowdown.
At the same time, the state and federal governments have shown an increased willingness to
make capital investments in rehabilitating the transit infrastructure. The Illinois FIRST
program, which funds transportation, education, and general infrastructure projects across the
state, agreed in 2001 to match funds with the federal New Start program to fund a $482 million
renovation of the Douglas branch of the Blue Line on Chicago's West Side. Without the
renovation, that entire elevated section would likely have been completely closed within a few
years. At the same time, the CTA's proposal for modernization and expansion of stations on the
Brown Line has also received federal New Start funding, and work has already begun on
changes that will add much-needed capacity to that line.
Yet many concerns remain. Just as during the heyday of the streetcar decades ago, the
majority of transit passengers in Chicago are carried by buses on the ground rather than on rail
rapid transit. Approximately two-thirds of CTA trips are bus passengers, yet the growth
described above has come mostly from increases in rail transit usage. As gentrification revived
some North and West Side neighborhoods, the ridership on the Brown Line (up almost 9% in
2001 over 2000) and the Green Line (up 7%) grew, and the other lines have increased as well. At
the same time, bus patronage has been stagnating or even declining. Looking forward, the CTA
continues to foresee modest growth on the rail side, which may exacerbate the peak-hour
congestion experienced on some lines. But despite a number of planned efforts for the bus
network, including schedule improvements and vehicle overhauls, the forecast ridership for
2004 is below that of 2002, in part because of a fare increase.
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The current governance and funding structures for public transportation in Chicago are also
a concern. The Regional Transportation Authority (RTA) was created by the General Assembly
in 1974 as the public body responsible for oversight of the CTA and also the suburban bus
(Pace) and commuter rail (Metra) systems. The most recent major changes to the RTA
legislation occurred more than twenty years ago (1983). Each of the three service boards
operates independently, but the RTA board has approval power over annual budgets, and
almost all public funding is channeled through the RTA. And while there is some political
concern over the makeup of the RTA board, the economic concerns relate to the funding
structures and budgetary constraints mandated by the RTA.
Operating subsidies for CTA, Pace, and Metra derive predominately from a region-wide
sales tax - 1% in Cook County and 1/4% in the collar counties. 85% of the funds collected from
this tax are allocated to the service boards strictly by geographical formula. The economic and
population growth in the suburbs has been much stronger than that in Chicago, and the sales
tax revenue growth in Chicago has trailed inflation. With the elimination of federal operating
support in the mid-1990s and the increasing and unfunded financial burden of paratransit, the
RTA has been forced to allocate nearly all of its annual discretionary funding to the CTA simply
to keep it operational. In fact, had funding levels since 1985 kept pace with inflation, the CTA
would receive $90 million more for operations in 2004. Because of this structure, Metra has
been "fully funded" by the RTA, and Metra ridership actually increased over the entire 1983-
2003 period. Yet this result is somewhat perverse, since the average Metra trip is much more
highly subsidized than the average CTA trip. In suburban Cook County, for example, where
both CTA and Metra operate, the estimated subsidy per trip is $1.45 for CTA but $2.47 for
Metra. 9
The other obstacle is the RTA-mandated recovery ratio, which requires that the three service
boards combined must recover at least 50% of their operating costs from the farebox and other
revenue sources such as advertising. (There are some minor exceptions and allowances.) While
the goal of enforcing cost-efficiency is well-intentioned, this mandate is strict compared to the
rest of the U.S. public transit industry and can induce perverse outcomes. When economic
conditions worsen and ridership stagnates or drops independently of agency performance (as
has happened very recently), the recovery ratio can force the agency into cutting service or
increasing fares at precisely the wrong time, potentially starting a vicious downward cycle.
9 Internal analysis by Jason Lee, Chicago Transit Authority, April 2004.
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2.3.2 Will Trucks Move?
The 15,000 daily intermodal truck movements mentioned above are projected to quadruple
within the next two decades. Chicago and its surrounding governments clearly must be
concerned about the congestion and potential safety hazards that may arise as these trucks
traverse local and arterial streets before they enter yards or access an interstate highway. At the
same time, however, if Chicago is to maintain its position as the premier inland port in the U.S.,
it must find ways to accommodate these transfers and ensure that they remain efficient.
In their 2001 paper, for example, Li et al. find that approximately two-thirds of the daily
container movements are local or cross-town, meaning that they rely heavily on non-interstate
roadways. While the roadways directly adjacent to the yards have often been improved, the
city intersections are often incompatible with large and even medium sized container trucks.
Long delays and safety hazards can occur in these situations (and become more problematic as
congestion increases), and the higher volume of pedestrians on the multi-use city streets poses
an additional concern. Yet despite the existence of an Intermodal Advisory Task Force, there
have been few concrete steps taken by the city to address this issue.
2.4 Conclusion: Evaluating Possible Changes
If street-based transportation is to continue to serve as a facilitator of Chicago's growth,
consideration must be given to improving its operational capability and capacity when
planning the transportation network of the coming years. In the next chapter, we review
methods for assessing and evaluating public transit, with an eye toward building a model that
can assist in evaluating the costs and benefits of changing public subsidies for transit.
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3 Framework: Transit Assessment and Evaluation
As outlined above, transit ridership has declined significantly in the postwar period, with
the intermittent periods of modest growth (including the recent mid-to-late 1990s increase)
unable to reverse a continuing trend of falling market share. The losses can be attributed both
to natural shifting to a competing mode which is superior for many types of trips and to
constraints (both explicit and implicit) which prevented transit from providing its services
optimally. Yet we cannot judge transit as a success or failure on ridership and market share
alone. More importantly, in order to assess the impacts of proposed changes to public transit
provision, we require a more comprehensive framework for decision-making. In this chapter,
we review available methodologies for evaluating transit investments.
3.1 Measuring Outcomes in the Absence of Profit
For firms in the private sector that receive no public subsidies, we generally make the
assumption that the ultimate objective of the firm is profit maximization. This requires an
abstraction from reality - it ignores, for example, the potential for agency problems between the
managers of the firm and its shareholders, and also the possibility that some firms have other
non-monetary goals for which they sacrifice profit. But overall, profit maximization subject to
budget constraints is a reasonable assumption for modeling firm behavior, and in a competitive
market without externalities (again, a strong assumption, and one which can often be violated)
this behavior also leads to social welfare maximization. Thus, we can reasonably evaluate and
compare long-run firm performance based on profit and profit-related measures (e.g., return on
assets).
For entities in the public sector, the task of performance evaluation is less clear. When part
or all of the costs of an agency are supported by revenues which are independent of the
agency's actions, the simple "profit-maximization-within-budget-constraint" framework is not
applicable, and the universe of possible behavioral goals for the agency grows considerably.
This issue is especially acute for public transit, which is not a classic public service like
firefighting or national defense which covers all citizens and does not "charge" for its services.
Instead, transit must target specific customers, determine appropriate fare levels, and constantly
manage service quality and availability, while at the same time receiving tax-financed public
funding from unrelated sources (e.g., sales taxes).
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In the postwar period, where transit has received subsidies from many levels of
government, a number of different possible managerial objectives have been identified. An
agency could plausibly act so as to: maximize total ridership; maximize service provision (e.g.,
vehicle miles); maximize total societal welfare; minimize fares; minimize required public
subsidy; or even maximize some "political" objective, such as wages to particular classes of
transit workers. The agency may be trying to achieve multiple goals at once, and the objectives
may shift over time as the political environment changes. For example, in his analysis of
management objectives at the Chicago Transit Authority, Savage (2002) finds evidence that the
CTA appears for the most part to have followed a strategy of maximizing service output subject
to a budget constraint of varying firmness (depending on the political situation). This, in turn,
implies management attempts to achieve unit cost minimization (allowing more service
production) and relatively high fares. He posits that during the mid-1970s, however, the large
increase in available subsidies effectively removed the budget constraint, and management
objectives shifted to lower fares and to increased compensation for labor. A more pessimistic
(but not necessarily incorrect) proposition is that most transit managers currently face so many
financial and political constraints that they seek to satisfice rather than optimize their service
provision. That is, simply maintaining the previous year's level of service, with minor
improvements if possible, may be an acceptable objective.
Thus, given the potential competing objectives of transit service providers, it seems unlikely
that we can identify a single measure with which to evaluate public transit. Instead, we will
examine a collection of indicators. First, we review internal indicators of performance,
concentrating on the dimensions of efficiency and effectiveness. These measures are useful for
comparing transit performance across time and across peer agencies, and will serve as key
points of sensitivity when constructing models to evaluate the efficacy of buying back transit
trips. Next, we review external measures of the benefits generated by transit. It is these benefits
which must ultimately be the source of our willingness to subsidize public transit. Finally, we
give a brief review of cost-benefit analysis, which will allow us to tie together the various
strands of investigation into a coherent framework.
3.2 Internal Assessment: Performance Evaluation
Academic and professional interest in transit performance evaluation in the U.S. began in
earnest in the 1970s. During this period, state and local governments were searching for
improved methodologies to monitor their newly-municipalized transit services. At the same
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time, the federal government was increasing the subsidies it was making available to public
transit providers and wanted a framework with which to evaluate the effects of those subsidies.
These two needs, combined with falling ridership and a general dissatisfaction over the
perceived performance of transit, led to significant research in this area.
3.2.1 Efficiency and Effectiveness
The seminal studies in performance evaluation - by Dajani and Gilbert and by Fielding,
among many others - make clear that performance evaluation for a public sector enterprise
must include indicators of both efficiency and effectiveness. An efficiency measure will gauge the
level of resources required by the transit provider to produce a given level of service output,
while an effectiveness measure will indicate the intensity of usage of the transit system by
riders, relative to the amount of service provided. Figure 3-1 outlines the basic relationships
among the inputs and outputs of transit provision.
INPUTS
(E.g., Labor Hours, Fuel
Expenses, Total Operating
Expenses)
00
SERVICEOUTPUTS Service- CONSUMPTION
(E.g., Revenue Vehicle Effectiveness (E.g., Passenger Trips,Hours, Revenue Passenger Miles)Vehicle Miles)
Figure 3-1: Transit Performance Analysis
This approach provides a useful framework for the transit analyst. When considering only
the production of transit, we can examine measures of cost-efficiency that relate the expenditure
of valuable input resources to the output of transit services. A measure such as 'total operating
expense per revenue vehicle hour' would fall into this category, though any number of similar
indicators can be created. Such a measure can be useful for examining the productive efficiency
of an agency and, when broken down into more discrete measures (such as vehicle hours per
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employee), it can provide guidance for cost reductions. These measures give no information,
however, about the attractiveness of the service that is created for the potential riders.
Indicators of service-effectiveness (the bottom leg of the Figure 3-1 triangle), which relate
service consumed to service provided, can offer guidance on the relevance and quality of the
transit service. A measure such as 'passenger miles per revenue vehicle mile' indicates to the
agency how intensively the services it provides are being used by passengers, and comparisons
across routes and times of day can be very instructive. Again, though, such measures cannot
provide the whole picture, as they ignore the cost of providing a given level of service.
Many researchers advocate judging overall transit performance by measures of cost-
effectiveness, as shown on the third leg of the triangle. In this view, the ultimate objective of the
transit agency is the generation of ridership, with vehicle miles and hours as simply
intermediate products in that process. In this view, then, the relevant indicators are ratios such
as 'passenger trips per dollar of operating expense' that express service consumption in terms of
input costs. Such an approach can be extended yet another step to incorporate the effects of fare
policy. If total farebox revenue (or, more generally, operating revenue) is removed from total
operating expense, then an indicator such as 'deficit per passenger trip' is available, which
describes the public subsidy required to generate a transit trip.
'Subsidy per trip' might appear at first to be a "holy grail" for transit evaluation, one that
could be used in place of market-based measures to compare performance across different
agencies and evaluate the suitability of further public funds to "buy" more transit trips for a
region. Yet despite the usefulness of the measure, such a hope is misplaced, for a number of
important reasons. First, the measure describes only the average transit trip on a system or
route, and contains very little information about the marginal cost of attracting new trips.
Second, such a gross measure offers little practical advice for targeting investments. Though
vehicle miles may be an intermediate good in the transit production process, the agency must
ultimately make its decisions on the basis of how and where to operate its vehicles. Moreover,
distributional issues - such as the inherent risk aversion that results from the political reality
that service cuts are more strongly perceived than service gains - may be stronger decision
factor than such "objective" performance measures. Third, even if we assume transit providers
are operating under identical optimization frameworks (a strong assumption), there can be
substantial differences in the constraints facing the agencies. System size, peak-to-base ratio,
average operating speed, population density, job location patterns, and many other exogenous
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and semi-exogenous factors can strongly influence the level of productivity available to a transit
provider and the attractiveness of transit to potential riders. In creating our model, we must
consider which factors are generic to transit as an industry and which are specific to Chicago
and other metropolitan areas.
3.2.2 Recent Performance Trends
Performance data on U.S. public transit is available through the National Transit Database
(NTD), an outgrowth of Section 15 of the Urban Mass Transportation Act. The federal
government requires that transit agencies report a wide range of data on ridership,
expenditures, and service provision across a number of modal and operational categories.
These reports are compiled annually into the NTD, which serves as a very useful (though not
flawless) source for performance evaluation.
We briefly present three performance indicators (as shown in Table 3-1) for motorbus
service provided by the Chicago Transit Authority and three other large transit agencies - those
in Boston, Houston, and Washington, DC - during the period 1996-2002. These three agencies
are useful comparisons because they are roughly similar in size to the CTA, and yet they exist in
diverse operational settings. The MBTA in Boston is one of the nation's oldest transit systems,
and much of Boston's initial development grew up around transit lines. WMATA in
Washington, DC, is a product of the surge in transit infrastructure investment in the 1960s and
70s and has become increasingly popular in the growing metropolitan DC area. METRO in
Houston has just introduced its first light rail line in 2004, and serves a more automobile-
focused and low-density population.
As noted above, a wide range of indicators can be created from basic data on costs, output,
and ridership. Most of these indicators have a high degree of collinearity, however, and
represent similar underlying processes. Because of this, a small set of indicators can provide a
large amount of information. In addition, while performance comparisons across agencies can
be useful, we avoid drawing conclusions from any differences at this stage. City-specific
exogenous factors may have a strong influence on performance, and differences in cost-
allocation methodologies may skew cross-agency results.
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PERFORMANCE DIMENSION SELECTED INDICATOR
Cost Efficiency Operating Expense per Vehicle Revenue Hour
Service Effectiveness Passengers per Vehicle Revenue Mile
Cost Effectiveness Operating Expense per Passenger Trip (Unlinked)
Table 3-1: Performance Indicators
3.2.2.1 Agency Bus Characteristics in 2002
Table 3-2 presents basic descriptors for the bus operations in Chicago and the three peer
agencies, in order to make later comparisons more meaningful. By all measures, Chicago is the
largest of the four agencies. Boston and Houston are comparable in expenditures and
passengers, though the MBTA has a much higher intensity of usage for the level of service it
provides. Washington, DC, operates a similar number of vehicles and bus hours to Houston,
but carries more passengers and faces a slightly higher peak-to-base ratio.
City (Agency)
Bus Operating Statistics Boston Chicago Houston Washington,
(MBTA) (CTA) (Metro) DC (WMATA)
Operating Expenses (000) $238,566 $559,684 $234,148 $342,559
Passengers (000) 108,692 303,295 94,777 147,771
Vehicle Revenue Hours (000) 2,451 6,576 3,138 3,349
Vehicles Operating in Maximum Service 863 1,695 1,227 1,247
Peak-to-Base Ratio 2.50 1.86 2.51 2.68
Table 3-2: Bus Operating Statistics (2002)
3.2.2.2 Cost Efficiency
The years from 1996 to 2002 were generally good ones for ridership in U.S. transit agencies,
as noted above. However, there was little progress made in improving bus cost efficiency in the
four agencies considered here. Figure 3-2 details the trends in real operating costs per revenue
vehicle hour during the period, with 1996 taken as the base year. All four agencies were
essentially flat over the period, with changes of only ±5% over six years. (The 2001 data point
for Houston is questionable.) This may be an indication that the fixed-proportions nature of bus
service production, where each vehicle-hour requires exactly one driver-hour, is difficult to
significantly alter. But it should also raise concerns when considering the sensitivity of a model
to cost-efficiency changes - such changes may be very difficult to achieve.
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Cost Efficiency:
Operating Expense Per Revenue Vehicle Hour
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Figure 3-2: Cost Efficiency Trends
3.2.2.3 Service Effectiveness
Figure 3-3 shows the trends across the same period in service effectiveness for the four
agencies. This measure of trips per revenue vehicle mile is one indicator of patronage intensity
or load factor. Again, the trends are not necessarily encouraging for these agencies. Chicago
and Houston remained essentially flat across the period, although both peaked at slightly
higher levels during 1999 and have since come down. Washington, DC, has shown a modest
increase during the period (roughly 8%), while Boston has trended downward, reducing its
service effectiveness by approximately 8%. All four of the agencies were adding revenue miles
to their networks during this period.
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Service Effectiveness:
Unlinked Passenger Trips/Revenue Vehicle Mile
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Figure 3-3: Service Effectiveness Trends
3.2.2.4 Cost Effectiveness
Finally, Figure 3-4 shows the agency trends in cost effectiveness over the 1996-2002 period as
measured by total real operating cost per unlinked passenger trip, again with 1996 as the base
year. The performance here was similar to that for service effectiveness. Chicago and Houston
were roughly flat across the period (though again Houston's recent volatility is cause for some
concern regarding the data), while Boston's cost per trip exceeded inflation by more than 12%
during the period. At the same time, nominal expenses per bus trip in Washington, DC, were
essentially flat, meaning that real costs fell by approximately 12%.
This final chart also clearly displays why cost-effectiveness is the key dimension from a
large-scale policy-making perspective. Consider the performance indicators for METRO in
Houston, a heavily auto-dependent area not often considered conducive to public transit
investments. If only service effectiveness is used to judge performance, then Houston certainly
lags compared to other large cities. Yet cost-effectiveness indicators show that providing bus
service in Houston is markedly cheaper than in other cities. If we combine these and look at
cost-effectiveness, we see that bus service in Houston is essentially as effective as that in
Washington, DC, and that the gap has been closing relative to the other agencies. We should
not write off potential investments in cities such as Houston simply because they do not
compare in intensity of usage with older, more transit-dependent cities.
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Cost Effectiveness:
Operating Expense Per Unlinked Passenger Trip
$2.40
0$2.20
06LS$2.00$1.80
t $1.60
o 0 $1.40
$1.20
$1.00
1 2002200120001999
Year
)96
----------
~--------~---~
------------- I---- ---------------------- ------------- -- --- - - - -
- - -
--- - -
---- 
- - -
- - -
- -
7 
----- -- 
-- 
-
- - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - ---- - -- -  --
- --- - -- - -
- - -
1998
[-+-Boston (MBTA) -*-Chicago (CTA) - Houston (METRO) --- Washington, DC (WMATA)
Figure 3-4: Cost Effectiveness Trends
3.3 External Assessment: Benefits of Public Transit
The framework described above for assessing the efficiency and effectiveness of a transit
provider has been valuable for the transit industry and those charged with monitoring it. Yet
that framework is too narrow to address questions about the larger economic and social value
of public transit investment, for it selects 'passenger trips' as the objective of interest and goes
no further. Moreover, it implicitly assumes an 'optimization' approach by transit managers
that, given the strong constraints under which they operate, may simply not be the case. To
answer such larger questions, we must specifically examine what value derives from the
investments and expenditures that create those passenger trips.
3.3.1 Macroeconomic Growth
Before turning to disaggregate measures of value, we consider the possibility that public
transit has a significant positive effect on overall economic growth. During the early 1990s, a
significant academic effort was focused on determining the relationship, if any, between public
sector capital investment and private sector productivity and output. Public transit clearly falls
under this umbrella, along with other public sector capital investments such as highways,
water, and sewers. An unambiguously positive linkage between public investment and growth
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would bolster transit supporters and perhaps eliminate the view among many that transit is
simply a social service of little overall value.
This research effort was spurred by Aschauer in 1989, who found a surprisingly large
economic impact from public investment. Using national level data, he estimated an elasticity
of private output with respect to public capital of 0.39, a value higher than the elasticity with
respect to private capital. These findings were supported by some researchers, such as Munnell
(1990), but were soon disputed by many others, including Garcia-Mila and McGuire (1992) and
Holtz-Eakin (1994). These researchers, using state-level data, found a negligible spillover effect
from public investment when the econometric framework was altered to account for state-
specific factors. The ambiguous findings of Morrison and Schwartz (1996), who took a narrower
view and considered the effects of infrastructure investments on manufacturing firms, are also
typical. They found that infrastructure investment had a positive effect on firm productivity,
but that the net social benefits could be positive or negative depending on the costs of raising
the funds and the overall growth rate of output in the economy.
Further study of the macroeconomic impact of public investment has languished recently, as
researchers have been unable to solve the complex econometric issues that have confounded
model estimation. A number of rival hypotheses remain potentially valid: that public
investment causes economic growth, possibly with a time lag and possibly with a further
multiplier effect; that economic growth spurs governments to undertake public investment; that
public investment is undertaken on the expectation of future growth; that multiplier effects from
capital investment are being captured; or that growth and public investment are essentially
unrelated. However, this open research question does not imply that public capital may
provide no benefits. As Holtz-Eakin writes regarding his finding of a zero elasticity of private
output with respect to state and local capital:
It would be wrong to conclude from this analysis that the large stock of
public capital provides no benefits. The regression analysis indicates
only that the productivity benefits in excess of direct provision of
amenities are negligible. It would be a departure of common sense to
argue that there are not important direct effects from the provision of
road networks, bridge, water supply systems, sewerage facilities, and the
host of other infrastructure services. Similarly, there are presumably a
wide array of capital expenditure projects that would survive a rigorous
benefit-cost examination. Instead, the main message is that the use of
aggregate data does not reveal sufficiently large linkages between public
sector capital and private production activities to support the contention
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that government capital spillovers are the source of economy-wide
variations in private productivity. [emphasis added]
Although Holtz-Eakin is writing only of capital investments, we believe his comments are
applicable to public transportation, which requires a mix of both capital investment (vehicles,
right-of-way, etc.) and simple expenditures (labor, fuel, etc.). With this in mind, we now
consider those "direct effects" of public transportation investment and expenditure through a
cost-benefit framework.
3.3.2 Cost-Benefit Analysis
The underlying principle behind cost-benefit analysis as a tool for transit evaluation is
simple. If the aim of public policy is to maximize net social welfare subject to financial and
political feasibility constraints, then a methodology is needed to consistently evaluate the
welfare changes from various potential projects. Yet large public investments generally involve
monopoly provision, significant changes in output, and indirect benefits distributed across
disparate groups (Meyer and Straszheim). For these reasons, it is very difficult to obtain the
price signals one usually uses as a guide to investment. Cost-benefit analysis has evolved as a
tool for indirectly creating such signals. If the costs and benefits of various projects can be
translated into a common unit (usually dollars), then the projects can be evaluated according to
the net stream of benefits they produce over a given period, and prioritization is a matter of
choosing those projects which provide the best return.
In practice, of course, this translation can be very difficult. The value of intangible benefits
(e.g., pollution reduction) is difficult to estimate. Benefits may be transferred among different
constituencies. The proper discounting of future costs and benefits can be especially
controversial, as some have even questioned the propriety of using cost-benefit analysis at all
when environmental or inter-generational questions are being considered.10 Yet if the analysis
process is transparent, with assumptions open to criticism and results used to inform a larger
political process, then there is widespread agreement that cost-benefit analysis is a very useful
tool (Small, 1999).
3.3.2.1 Basic Principles and Problems
Although many methods exist for measuring the social gain associated with a project, net
present value (NPV) is the preferred methodology for the estimation of costs and benefits across
10 See, for example, Heinzerling and Ackerman, "Pricing the Priceless."
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time. Many extended treatments of the NPV approach exist, so only key points are noted here.
Figure 3-5 below shows a stylized chart of the required steps for determining the NPV of a
project. A number of complicated issues, both theoretical and practical, appear immediately in
this brief diagram.
Determine the time horizon under consideration
Estimate project costs in each future period
Translate any non-monetary costs into dollar figures
Estimate gross project benefits in each future period
Translate any non-monetary gross benefits into dollar figures
Determine the net benefit (gross benefit - cost) in each period
Determine the appropriate market discount rate for the project
Discount the net benefit in each period back to the present
Sum all discounted net benefits to determine the project NPV
Figure 3-5: Theoretical NPV Calculation
Determining the appropriate time frame for analysis is perhaps of less concern, as the
expected usable life of the facility offers some guidance. Likewise, the determination of
monetary project costs is a surmountable problem, although both genuine uncertainty and the
biases of project evaluators can cause strong divergence between predicted and actual costs, as
researchers such as Pickrell have demonstrated. Finally, there are pitfalls involved in measuring
benefits since the benefits can be transferred. In the classic example, a rise in land values
following a transportation improvement in a corridor represents a transfer to land owners of
some of the benefits (usually time savings) initially conferred on the travelers. Improvements in
understanding and modeling technique, however, have mitigated much of this double-
counting.
The difficulty in assigning monetary values to the non-monetary costs and benefits of a
project is of greater concern. The standard approach is to calculate some measure of
"willingness-to-pay" for the benefit or cost. To judge the benefit of an improvement in safety,
for example, analysts will often use the wage differential between similar jobs with different
risks of injury or death as a proxy. Even this approach is difficult for benefits like dispersed
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environmental improvements (such as a reduction in carbon dioxide emissions), and analysts
have had difficulty incorporating such improvements into their models consistently.
The choice of an appropriate interest rate for discounting is also challenging. Using market
rates requires two assumptions: that the market in which the project exists is "perfect," and that
income maximization is the criterion for project evaluation. Most markets are demonstrably
"imperfect" in the economic sense - borrowing and lending may not be possible at the same
rates, full information is often not available, and some actors may have market power. Yet in
more developed countries such as the U.S., these imperfections are generally not deemed fatal.
Meyer and Straszheim claim that in such cases, highly-rated long-term corporate debt is
reasonable as a cost-of-capital estimate for the public sector, since it measures the private
investment displaced by bonding or taxing. The question of the proper maximization criterion
is less clear. Many have advocated that a lower "social" discount rate, which explicitly
increases the value placed on costs and benefits borne by future persons, should be used.
The obvious "social" aspect of public investment is the foundation of the most common
criticism of cost-benefit analysis. By its nature, an NPV calculation cannot determine the
distributional effects of a project across society, and these effects are clearly important for the
political process in which project evaluation occurs. But cost-benefit analysis does perform an
important function by identifying projects that are potential Pareto improvements. That is, it
finds projects where benefits outweigh costs such that "winners" could compensate "losers"
and leave all parties better off. Thus, as long as cost-benefit analysis is used as part of a process
that also identifies and addresses distributional effects, its use as a decision-making tool is
appropriate.
3.3.2.2 Related Measures
Two concepts that are closely related to NPV are also of interest: the benefit-cost ratio (BCR)
and the internal rate of return (IRR). To calculate the BCR of a project, gross benefits and costs
are tallied separately and then discounted. The BCR is then simply the ratio of discounted gross
benefits to discounted costs. For a given discount rate, NPV and BCR will give the same signal
about basic project attractiveness (i.e., a positive NPV or a BCR greater than unity), but they
may produce different rankings of the "best" projects. When budgetary constraints are in effect,
these potential differences should be considered.
The IRR provides a slightly different perspective than the NPV, but it must be used
cautiously. The calculation essentially proceeds in reverse - the IRR is the discount rate at
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which the NPV of the stream of costs and benefits of a project is zero. Projects can then be
ranked according to their IRRs, and the decision rule in a situation with unconstrained budgets
would be to approve any project with an IRR greater than the relevant cost-of-capital (again, not
always an obvious figure). A "return on investment" measure such as IRR has great appeal to
analysts and decision-makers, since it translates complex projects into the language of standard
financial instruments.
However, Brealey and Myers, among others, have cautioned against using IRR as a decision
tool. In extreme cases, multiple IRRs (which are simply roots of the NPV function) can be
found. However, in most investments where costs are incurred up front and benefits are
reaped in the future, this proves to not be an issue. Of more concern is the potential conflict
between NPV and IRR in cases of mutually exclusive investments, as is often the case in
transportation. An IRR calculation assumes that project benefits are reinvested at the IRR, while
an NPV calculation assumes they are reinvested at the discount rate. In this case, a strict IRR
decision rule could lead to misallocation of resources. In response to this critique, many
analysts perform modified internal rate of return (MIRR) calculations that assume reinvestment
at the relevant cost-of-capital. For transportation projects, this appears to be especially
appropriate.
3.3.2.3 Practical Implications
The use of cost-benefit analysis across agencies and levels of government varies widely. In
some cases, cost-benefit analysis can be mandated and used as a primary regulatory tool (such
as in the Safe Drinking Water Act"), while other statutes (such as the Clean Air Act) require that
public health and technological feasibility must be the guiding principles. In order to ground
later analyses in the relevant environment, some of the key legislation and regulation that
governs transportation investment decision-making is outlined below.
3.3.2.3.1 Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
The OMB last updated its Circular A-94 ("Discount Rates to be Used in Evaluating Time-
Distributed Costs and Benefits") in 1992. The circular mandates that cost-benefit analyses of
investments and regulations should report NPV and related measures based on a real discount
rate of 7%, although it encourages calculating sensitivity measures and allows other discount
11 See, for example, "Understanding the Safe Drinking Water Act," U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, 1999.
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rates in limited circumstances. Two other sections of the circular deserve consideration when
the question of improving practice is addressed. First, the circular's 'Purpose' states that "the
goal of [the] Circular is to promote efficient resource allocation through well-informed decision-
making by the Federal Government." Second, the circular addresses the question of using IRR
measures:
Analyses may include among the reported outcomes the internal rate of
return implied by the stream of benefits and costs. ... While the internal
rate of return does not generally provide an acceptable decision criterion,
it does provide useful information, particularly when budgets are
constrained or there is uncertainty about the appropriate discount rate
[emphasis added].
3.3.2.3.2 Federal Transit Administration (FTA)
A review of the FTA New Start program is instructive regarding the implementation of cost-
benefit analysis. TEA-21 outlines the project evaluation procedures for federal transit
investments under the New Start program. The procedures are closely tied to environmental
impact requirements in NEPA. After a corridor has been identified as having mobility needs,
an alternatives analysis must be undertaken. This analysis, which requires preliminary
engineering, is meant as an initial public evaluation of all reasonable potential actions,
including a "no action" option. Projects that survive the alternatives analysis undergo a more
detailed evaluation on a number of dimensions, including:
- Direct and indirect costs
- Congestion relief
- Improved mobility
- Air and noise pollution
- Energy consumption
e Associated ancillary and mitigation costs
- Reductions in local infrastructure costs
Finally, the projects are evaluated on the quality of the local financing. Reliability, evidence of
contingency planning, and the ability to continue operating the existing system at an acceptable
level are expected. After this three-step process, projects are rated as 'highly recommended,'
'recommended,' or 'not recommended.' 121 3 The Blue Line reconstruction for the Chicago Transit
12 "Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century" (Public Law 105-178), Sec 3009.
13 Council on Environmental Quality, Regulations for NEPA Implementation, Part 1502 (Environmental
Impact Statement).
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Authority, for example, only achieved its 'highly recommended' status after the Illinois FIRST
program provided significant and steady local financing.
Based on this description, it would seem that cost-benefit analysis would be a primary tool
in FTA project evaluation. This is not the case. Many of the elements of cost-benefit analysis
are present (though disparate rather than unified), yet there is an apparent unwillingness to
commit to the kind of priority-setting that cost-benefit analysis might imply. While a measure
of caution would of course be appropriate in attempting to value project benefits, for the
reasons outlined above, TEA-21 went significantly further and expressly prohibited the
consideration of the dollar value of mobility improvements. While such a prohibition appears to
increase the flexibility of decision-makers when considering projects, it may also serve to
obscure important aspects of the project's risk and return. This apparently sub-optimal process
is a reflection of the "lumpiness" of transit investments and jurisdictional conflicts that often
occur during the political process.
3.3.2.3.3 Federal Highway Administration (FHWA)
With the completion of the Interstate system, the focus of FHWA investment has shifted to
maintenance, rehabilitation, and pollution and congestion mitigation. Again, the use of cost-
benefit analysis appears to be inconsistent. When informally analyzing the impact of highway
improvements on freight and logistics organizations, for example, FHWA is willing to explicitly
discuss cost-benefit analysis, methodologies for improving benefit estimation, and strategies for
dealing with both competitive and monopolized markets. 14 The Highway Economic
Requirements System (HERS), which was recently developed, also provides explicit cost-benefit
rankings of potential improvements to deficient highway sections. 15 Yet when a study of the
Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality (CMAQ) program was authorized by TEA-21, only a
mandate to assess the cost-effectiveness of mitigation projects was included. While clearly not
without value, this analysis simply ranks projects based on minimum cost for achieving a given
mitigation level, and it says nothing about an appropriate level. Again, an opportunity for
more sophisticated analysis is potentially being missed.
14 FHWA White Paper, "Cost-Benefit Analysis of Highway Improvements in Relation to Freight
Transportation," December 2000, HLB Decision Economics.
15 U.S. General Accounting Office, Highway Infrastructure: FHWA's Model for Estimating Highway Needs Has
Been Modified for State-Level Planning, February 2001 (GAO-01-299).
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3.3.2.3.4 State of Illinois
Transportation improvement in Illinois is guided in part by the Illinois Capital Budget Act
and the Illinois Highway Code. The methodologies for project evaluation included in these acts
are quite vague, and probably intentionally so. The Capital Budget Act requires that five-year
capital budget programs be prepared that include "economic assumptions, engineering
standards, estimates of spending for operations and maintenance, federal and State regulations,
and estimation of demand for services."'16 The Highway Code, describing planning and
programming at the state level, merely authorizes IDOT to determine the "reasonably
anticipated future need" for highway investments by making traffic surveys, studying facilities,
and collecting and reviewing data that affects "judicious planning."17
However, IDOT will use cost-benefit analysis in limited situations. The state's Rail Freight
Program (RFP), for example, offers grants and low interest loans for rail improvements that will
foster economic development. The evaluation of projects depends on a benefit/cost ratio, and
benefits such as job creation and retention are expected to be explicitly described.18 As at the
federal level, there appears to inconsistency in the application of rigorous cost-benefit analysis.
3.4 Creating a Cost-Benefit Model
The general framework outlined by the New Starts legislation for FTA is the most relevant
for our current assessment. But a clarification is required, as we have spoken somewhat loosely
about "investment" in public transit. The theoretical and practical frameworks described above
are largely designed for capital projects. In upcoming chapters, we will describe hypothetical
public policy objectives that require a mix of capital and operating expenditures, spread out
over a number of years. We believe that the cost-benefit framework - balancing the costs of
planned public expenditures against expected benefits - is still the proper methodology to
examine these objectives, provided that we account for the public cost of raising the funds via
taxation. In fact, given that customers are likely to respond to service improvements in a
relatively short timeframe (as compared to the many years or even decades that usually
accompany a cost-benefit analysis for a major capital investment), we may find some
surprisingly positive results.
16 Illinois Compiled Statutes, 20 ILCS 3010, Sec. 3.
17 Illinois Compiles Statutes, 605 ILCS 5, Sec. 4-303.
18 Illinois Department of Transportation, Bureau of Railroads, Rail Freight Program
(www.dot.state.il.us/rfp.html).
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Early transportation analyses tended to focus almost exclusively on changes in in-vehicle
travel time as the criterion for project benefits. Extensive research has expanded our
understanding of the impacts of transportation investment, however, and there is now a broad
compilation of major and minor benefits that can be included as part of the decision-making
process.
3.4.1 Direct Benefits
The direct benefits of an expenditure on transit are those which accrue immediately to the
travelers affected by the change in the transportation network. Improvements in in-vehicle travel
time are the most obvious direct benefit. For example, the introduction of signal priority on a
major arterial (one of the suggested components of bus rapid transit) will increase average bus
speeds and generate in-vehicle travel time savings to transit passengers in that corridor. Of
course, the potential for benefit is not limited to transit riders - transit service in a high-demand
corridor can draw some auto users off the road, which improves the driving times of those
travelers who continue to drive.
The second major category of direct benefits is improvements in out-of-vehicle time, and this
category is especially important for transit. Generally this encompasses transfer time, waiting
time, and access time, and studies have almost universally found that travelers find time spent
out-of-vehicle as significantly more costly than time spent in-vehicle. For automobile travel, the
total time spent out-of-vehicle can usually be optimized to be very small - transfers and waiting
are unnecessary and walking access is generally short (especially at home). Often the only
uncertainty arises from time spent searching for parking. For transit providers, especially one
like the CTA whose passengers rely extensively on transfers, these out-of-vehicle time costs are
crucial, and improvements here provide major benefits to users.
3.4.2 Indirect Benefits
The indirect benefits of a transit expenditure are no less real than the direct benefits, but
they can be harder to identify and quantify because they accrue outside of the production of the
transit service. Reductions in environmental externalities - improvements in air quality and water
and noise pollution - are the primary indirect benefit which accrues to the region as a whole.
The Chicago metropolitan region, for example, has been designated by the Environmental
Protection Agency as a "severe non-attainment" area for ozone, and transportation sources
(both auto and transit) are major sources of ozone precursors. A shift of travelers towards
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transit and away from private automobiles will reduce vehicle miles traveled, and if the transit
service is sufficiently heavily utilized, the net emissions in the region may be reduced.
A second category of indirect benefit which has received some academic treatment recently
is option value. Many travelers in an area served by transit will not choose transit for their
commuting journey or for typical non-work journeys and will travel by automobile instead.
However, the transit network still has value to these people for infrequent or unanticipated
trips - that is, the option of using transit has benefit even if it is rarely or never selected. The
classic example is using transit while an automobile is being repaired, but the occasional trip
into downtown for an athletic event (when parking would be very expensive) or availability for
visiting guests also can be evaluated in this framework. Valuation of such a "real option" is not
as simple as evaluating a financial option (e.g., using Black-Scholes), but clearly such benefits
exist and are one reason that transit draws public support even from those who almost never
use it.
3.4.3 Double-Counting of Benefits
As noted earlier, the benefits which flow from a transportation investment or expenditure
can be transferred from travelers to other actors in the economy, and the analyst must be
cautious not to double-count such benefits. When the construction of a heavy rail transit line
raises property values in areas surrounding the new stations, for example, this incremental
value is not additive to the direct travel-related benefits of the rail line. Rather, the higher prices
reflect a (partial) capitalization of those travel-related benefits.
If the investment or expenditure is large enough to encourage a significant change in land
use patterns, however, it is possible that additional benefits will be generated that are
independent of the original travel-related benefits. Rail transit stations, for example, can
encourage more dense development in their immediate vicinity. Because of the higher density,
this development may be cheaper (on a per-unit basis) to service with public facilities such as
utilities and emergency services. Large cities which are well-served by transit may also have
added labor market efficiencies (employers and workers are easier to "match up") and
agglomeration efficiencies (the density of firms increases competition and lowers transaction
costs).
In this analysis, we will not consider possible changes in property value that might flow
from the proposed changes in transit provision, and will instead focus directly on the mobility,
congestion, and air quality benefits. Moreover, in an already-dense city with an established
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transit network like Chicago, the likelihood of significant land use benefits from the
expenditures being considered here seems remote. (The long-term land use impacts of a heavy
rail investment such as the proposed Circle Line, conversely, will need to be significant if the
project is to be justified.)
3.5 Valuing Benefits
This analysis considers potential transit investments and expenditures at a strategic level as
a guide to public policy. To inform these choices, we need to bracket the potential benefits from
the proposed changes. This can be accomplished with relatively simple benefit models using
aggregate measures. After the high-level assessment, the evaluation of specific projects, such as
the introduction of an express bus service in a particular corridor, would require disaggregate
travel demand modeling which is beyond the scope of the analysis presented here. In addition,
we speak here of the benefits flowing from an improvement in service, but the same
assessments can and will be made regarding a loss of benefits if service is reduced or fares are
increased.
3.5.1 Mobility Changes
A significant fraction of the benefits from the proposed transit service improvement will
come in the form of mobility improvements for transit riders. The most comprehensive way to
gauge these benefits is to estimate the gain in consumer surplus for these riders. By adding and
improving service, the generalized (overall) user cost associated with transit is reduced, which
both benefits existing passengers and draws in new transit riders.
The shaded areas in Figure 3-6 represent this gain in consumer welfare. A linear demand
curve is shown, which for moderate changes in cost and ridership is a standard simplification.
The larger rectangle on the left of the represents the gain to people already riding the transit
system whose trip-making behavior remains the same following the service improvement. The
smaller triangle on the right is the gain accruing to those new transit passengers. By reducing
user cost from GCo to GC 1, ridership increases from To to T1 . The total change in consumer
surplus is then:
AB = )(GCO - GCI)
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Measuring changes in transit trip volume is simple, given the ridership generation modeling
of the previous chapter. (We are choosing to measure volume with passenger trips rather than
passenger-miles, but either could be used.) Estimating user costs per trip, however, is more
challenging. The generalized user cost function will have three major components: out-of-
pocket costs, in-vehicle travel time, and out-of-vehicle time.
Gains to
GC --------- New Riders
0
U
GC1 .
D-1 (GC) = Transit Demand
Gains to
Existing
Riders
To Ti
Transit Trip Volume
Figure 3-6: Gains in Consumer Surplus
- Out-of-pocket costs: Under a service improvement scenario, out-of-pocket costs (i.e.,
fares) will remain constant and will net out of the calculation.
- In-vehicle travel time: Two important estimates are required here - the value to the
passenger of each minute of travel time saved, and the average number of minutes
saved following the service expansion.
- Out-of-vehicle time: A second estimate of the value of time is required here, in
addition to estimates of the average amount of time saved in each of the out-of-
vehicle categories (access, transfer, and waiting).
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3.5.2 Congestion
As travelers move from the automobile to transit in response to the improved service, the
reduction in vehicle miles traveled (VMT) will lower the cost of congestion in the region. A
rigorous determination of the changes in corridor-level travel times and congestion levels
requires a detailed traffic simulation and planning model, but we can generate an estimate of
the expected gains from a reduction in VMT by utilizing historical congestion data for Chicago
from the Texas Transportation Institute's (TTI) annual Mobility Survey.
Figure 3-7 displays twenty years (1982-2001) of VMT and congestion cost data from TTI for
the Chicago metropolitan area. Estimated daily VMT on highways and principal arterial roads
are shown on the horizontal axis, while constant-dollar congestion costs (in 2001 dollars) are
given on the vertical axis. In those twenty years, daily VMT in the region doubled from
approximately 45 million to over 90 million. But annual real congestion costs are estimated to
have quadrupled, from $1 billion to over $4 billion. A simple least-squares regression gives a
relationship between growth in VMT and growth in real costs which can use to perform 'what-
if' estimates of the benefits from reducing VMT growth. Of course, the true relationship
between vehicle miles traveled and congestion at a micro level can be significantly non-linear,
but the TTI data will at least allow a bracketing of the likely values. In addition, using only data
from the previous ten years, the congestion cost of incremental VMT appears to be higher than
that shown here, which is an expected result as the region gets larger and more congested. We
will present results using estimates from this shorter period.
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Vehicle Miles Traveled and Real Congestion Cost
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Figure 3-7: VMT and Real Congestion Costs for Chicago (1982-2001)
3.5.3 Air Quality Changes
Pollution represents the major uncompensated externality from surface transportation,
whether from gasoline-powered private vehicles, diesel trucks and motor buses, or generating
plants which supply the power to electrified heavy rail transit. We focus here only on the
human health costs of air pollution, which research has indicated accounts for a significant
majority of the total external environmental costs of motor vehicle usage in the United States
(see, for example, Delucchi 2000). However, the additional negative environmental effects of
motor vehicle usage - visibility losses and crop damage from air pollution, noise and water
pollution, and the hard-to-estimate effects of greenhouse gases - should be included in any
public decision-making process.
Fortunately, the past thirty years have seen a great improvement in transportation-related
pollution in the United States. Following the passage of the 1970 Clean Air Act and its
subsequent amendments, which enacted increasingly strict motor vehicle emissions restrictions,
aggregate emissions (in tons) of the six "criteria" pollutants fell by 48%. Figure 3-8 below, from
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the EPA, shows the significant reductions achieved for carbon monoxide, volatile organic
compounds, and sulfur dioxide, as well as the 98% reduction in lead pollution following the
elimination of leaded gasoline.
Comparison of 1970 and 2002 Emissions
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Figure 3-8: Criteria Pollutant Emissions in the U.S.
(from the US EPA)
Despite these gains, however, the health costs associated with motor vehicle air pollution -
especially from particulate matter - are still of concern. If additional investments and
expenditures on public transit can reduce overall vehicle miles traveled, then the resulting
changes in air quality should be included in a benefit/cost estimation. We will use the recent
work by McCubbin and Delucchi (1999) as a primary source for estimating these benefits,
following the lead of the TCRP in its handbook. Using their high and low estimates of the
environmental costs of motor vehicle travel, in conjunction with our model predictions of
changes in private automobile VMT and diesel motor bus VMT, we can bracket an estimate of
the monetary value of changes in air quality. Figure 3-9 shows their estimates of the per-mile
air pollution costs for light-duty gasoline vehicles (LDGV) and heavy-duty diesel vehicles
(HDDV). The 'v' figures represent tailpipe emissions only, while 'v+u' figures represent tailpipe
plus upstream pollution.
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Cost per Mile of Motor Vehicle Travel,
based on a 10 per cent Reduction in Motor-Vehicle-Related Emissions
(cents per vehicle mile travelled in the USA in 1990)
Particulate Matter Carbon Monoxide
(PM) Ozone (03) (CO) NO 2  Other Toxics Total
Vehicle Emission
Type Source Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High
LDGV v 0.48 7.02 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.37 0.04 0.22 0.00 0.05 0.58 7.71
v+u 0.56 7.50 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.37 0.04 0.22 0.00 0.05 0.66 8.20
HDDV v 4.18 79.93 0.02 0.19 0.01 0.07 0.15 0.98 0.02 0.33 4.35 81.19
1_ _ Iv+u 4.43 81.37 0.02 0.20 0.01 0.07 0.15 0.99 0.02 0.33 4.61 82.63
Figure 3-9: McCubbin/Delucchi (1999) Estimates of Air Pollution Costs Per VMT
3.6 Conclusion: Creating a Baseline
We have outlined the challenges facing public transit in Chicago and across the U.S., both in
terms of political and market constraints and in terms of relatively stagnant measures of
internal performance. We have also identified a coherent theoretical framework for costs and
benefits with which to evaluate potential investments in those transit systems. Now, in
Chapters 4 and 5, we will examine baseline projections in Chicago and then create a specific cost
model to test various investment and expenditure possibilities.
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4 Baseline: Preventing Ridership Loss
In Chapter Two, we identified some of the long-standing historical and political constraints
facing public transportation in Chicago, and in Chapter Three we examined different measures
for evaluating public transit's performance. Before using this framework to consider any long-
term structural changes, however, the looming operational crisis at the CTA must be analyzed.
Facing a stagnant regional economy and a reduction in public funding, the CTA acted to avert a
crisis in 2004 without resorting to service cuts by raising base fares. If a significant change in
available public support is not forthcoming, the crisis will expand in 2005 and later years. In
order to meet the fiscal requirements of the Regional Transportation Authority, the CTA will be
forced into a combination of significant fare increases or heavy cuts in service.
4.1 Fare Policy at the CTA
Figure 4-1 shows the progression of real and nominal CTA base fares since 1978, as well as
the average farebox revenue received by the agency per unlinked trip. The pattern for nominal
fares is clear, with long periods at a constant fare broken by shorter crisis periods with one or
more fare increases. The CTA had in fact held nominal base fares constant at $1.50 for a decade.
Real base fares have had a "floor" of approximately $1.40-$1.50 in 2003 dollars - whenever fares
have reached that level, they have been pushed back up (including the most recent 2004 fare
hike). Nominal revenue per unlinked trip has risen fairly steadily throughout the period,
except for the years 1998-2000 when the introduction of electronic fare media and increasing
discounts off the base reduced the agency's average fare slightly. Interestingly, the agency is
currently receiving approximately the same real revenue per trip as it did 25 years ago, despite
the massive changes that the system and the city have undergone.
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CTA Base Fares and Revenue Per Unlinked Trip
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Figure 4-1: CTA Fares and Per-Trip Revenue (1978-2005)
Figure 4-2 then maps real fares and real farebox revenue per trip against total bus and rail
ridership (unlinked trips). We see clearly that the two periods of greatest ridership loss were
contemporaneous with the financial crisis periods where fares were raised most sharply. These
periods - during the early 1980s and the early 1990s - are described more fully in Table 4-1. In
each case, a 50% increase in base fares resulted in a 34% increase in average fare per unlinked
trip and significant ridership losses in both periods. Of course, the ridership declines were not
caused only by the fare increases, as service cuts and stagnant or falling economies were also
strong factors in both periods. However, the transit environment in 2004 is not dissimilar, and
similar fare increases are not outside of the CTA's current consideration.
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CTA Real Fares and Revenue/Trip vs. Ridership
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Figure 4-2: CTA Fares, Revenue, and Ridership (1978-2004)
Early 1980s* Early 1990s
Start Year 1980 1990
End Year 1981 1993
Nominal Base Fare
Start $0.60 $1.00
End $0.90 $1.50
% Change 50% 50%
Nominal RevenueTrip
Start $0.31 $0.60
End $0.41 $0.80
% Change 34% 34%
Annual Trips (000)
Start 692,430 567,461
End 642,804 444,923
% Change -7.2% -21.6%
* Ridership change 1979-1982 was -14%
Table 4-1: Periods of Financial Crisis at the CTA
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4.2 Financial Projections and Ridership Implications
The "budget marks" given to the CTA for 2004 budget planning indicate that the public
funding available to the agency from the RTA will be $441.6 million for each year from 2004 to
2006. This figure is not only decreasing in real value over time, but also is a decrease in nominal
terms from public funding available in 2003. The combination of a stagnant regional economy
and continued below-inflation rate growth of tax receipts in Cook County is the stated reason
for this budget mark. This level of funding will severely impact the CTA's ability to provide
continuing levels of service, and increases in petroleum and power prices in 2004 (subsequent to
the budget marking) have made the situation even more tenuous.
A consolidated CTA statement of expenses and revenues for 2003-2006 is given in Table 4-2.
Figures for 2003 are projected (not yet finally confirmed) and 2004 figures represent the
officially accepted 2004 budget. The 2005-06 figures are planning forecasts and have not been
accepted by the RTA.
(all figures in 000s)
EXPENSE AND REVENUE STATEMENT
Operating Expenses
2003 Proj 2004 Budg 2005 Plan 2006 Plan
Labor $662,228 $687,528 $701,881 $718,747
Material 63,500 66,000 67,500 65,000
Fuel (Revenue Equipment) 23,995 23,000 24,840 24,840
Electric Power (Rev. Equip.) 20,100 22,000 23,000 23,000
Injury/Damage Provision 17,568 22,000 19,000 27,000
Security 24,800 25,042 25,794 26,567
Paratransit 41,000 45,113 46,918 48,325
Other Expenses 40,500 45,945 47,323 48,743
Total Operating Expenses $893,691 $936,628 $956,256 $982,222
System Generated Revenue
Fares and Passes $367,000 $394,512 $421,031 $438,758
Reduced Fare Reimbursement 32,300 32,300 32,300 32,300
Advertising, Charter, Concessions 22,000 24,250 26,250 30,750
Investment 2,415 3,000 3,000 3,000
Local Government 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000
Other Revenue 11,488 35,935 27,042 30,783
Total System Revenue $440,203 $494,997 $514,623 $540,591
Public Funding Required $453,488 $441,631 $441,633 $441,631
Fraction of Operating Expenses Covered By
Fares and Passes 41.1% 42.1% 44.0% 44.7%
Table 4-2: CTA Revenues and Expenses (2003-06)
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The figures presented in the financial plan contain the approaching crisis for the CTA. In
this proposal, total operating expenses are projected to grow at approximately 3.2% annually
from 2003 to 2006, with labor costs (which constitute over 70% of operating expenses) growing
at a slightly slower rate of 2.8%. These growth rates are in line with general inflation
expectations, although certain expense components such as health care are projected to grow at
rates exceeding inflation. But the zero growth in available public funding forces system
generated revenue to grow at a rate of over 7% per year, with fare and pass revenue increasing
at over 6% per year. Sustained (year over year) growth in farebox revenue of this magnitude is
simply without precedent in the CTA's postwar history. No ridership projections accompany
the revenue figures, but we can create simple scenarios which might explain or reconcile such
projections.
4.2.1 Scenario A: Constant Average Fare Revenue Per Trip
The budgeted average farebox revenue per trip in 2004 is $0.87. If this ratio were to hold
constant in 2005-06, it would imply 483 million total unlinked trips in 2005 and 503 million trips
in 2006. This would require ridership growth of almost 6.7% from 2004 to 2005 and 4.2% from
2005 to 2006. Ridership growth on this scale has occurred before - the two-year ridership
growth from 1997 to 1999 was of similar magnitude. But that growth had a constellation of
positive causal factors: it occurred at the height of the late-1990s economic boom, after five years
of a constant fare, and after the CTA "bottomed out" following a round of painful service cuts.
To plan for such growth, only one year after a fare increase and without any reasonable
expectation of returning to such a strong economic environment, seems highly unlikely.
4.2.2 Scenario B: Reasonable Ridership Growth
A more reasonable (but still aggressive) expectation for ridership growth might be 2% per
year, implying 457 million passengers in 2005 and 471 million passengers in 2006. Such a
projection is problematic, though, for it implies that ridership will increase at the same time that
average fare per trip is also rising significantly - to $0.91 per trip in 2005 and $0.93 in 2006.
Standard assumptions about the shape of the demand curve for transit argue against this, and
the recent history of the CTA does as well - in the periods of increasing ridership from 1982-
1985 and 1997-2001, the nominal average fare revenue per trip stayed flat or declined. This
scenario also seems like an unlikely candidate for the CTA.
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4.2.3 Scenario C: Significantly Higher Fares
Suppose that the upcoming financial crunch forces a repeat of the experiences of the early
1980s and 1990s. Here we envision a similar fare hike occurring in stages from 2003 through
2006. A 50% increase in the base nominal fare from its 2003 level would put the cost of a one-
way trip on the CTA at $2.25 by 2006. This is certainly not an implausible figure - the base fare
on New York City Transit was recently increased to $2.00, and the rush-hour fare in the
Washington, DC, metro area for many longer subway trips is $3.00 or more. We then assume
that per-trip average revenue would be $1.00 in 2005 and $1.10 in 2006 (a 34% increase from
2003 levels). These figures imply ridership levels of 421 million trips in 2005 and 399 million in
2006 - a loss of 49 million trips, or 11%, from 2003. This heavy loss is well within the range of
experience from the previous two fare increases.
4.3 Costs of Ridership Loss
The higher fares scenario is the most realistic of the three presented above. A relevant
question which arises, then, is the level of added public funding which would be required to
mitigate the ridership losses in 2005-06 without additional fare increases or service cuts. If we
assume constant (zero-growth) ridership at 453 million per year in 2005 and 2006, and also a
constant average fare per trip of $0.87, then fare and pass revenue will be $395 million in each
year. If all other revenue and expense items remain the same, the public funding gap would be
$26.5 million in 2005 and $44.2 million in 2006. Additional funding at this level in 2006 would
essentially cover the paratransit expenses that are so costly for the CTA to provide, although
such funding would violate the existing recovery ratio requirements. A portion of this increase
could come simply from increases in tax revenues if the economy outperforms expectations, but
the recent experience of tax revenue growth in Cook County indicates that a change in the RTA
taxing structure would be required to achieve this level of funding. What would be gained by
this additional public funding?
4.3.1 Alternative Travel Mode
If 50 million annual transit trips are lost in 2006 (versus 2003) because of a fare increase,
these trips must "go someplace." A survey by McCollum Management in 1999 (and quoted as
Table 10-18 in the TCRP "Traveler Response..." Handbook) of bus riders in Chicago and other
cities determined the riders' alternative travel mode if transit were unavailable. This is not the
same as alternate mode choice in response to a transit fare increase, and we expect that the
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response among heavy rail riders would be more strongly weighted toward the automobile.
However, it at least provides a reasonable baseline for estimating what happens to lost transit
trips. The Chicago data are presented in Table 4-3.
Mode Percentage
Car 14.0%
Ride w/ Someone 23.7%
Walk 15.2%
Taxi 16.1%
Bicycle 2.9%
Not Make Trip 23.8%
Multiple Answers 4.2%
Table 4-3: Alternate Modes For Chicago Bus Riders
We see that nearly one-quarter of bus riders say they would simply abandon their trips if
transit were not available, while almost 40% would shift to auto (either alone or as a passenger)
and the rest would walk, bike, or use a taxi. These figures are similar across the other cities
surveyed by McCollum, though the taxi fraction is higher in Chicago, which is unsurprising.
These estimates can guide an estimation of losses suffered by travelers.
4.3.2 Consumer Surplus Loss to Existing Travelers
The largest burden from the fare increase described in Scenario C above is borne by
continuing transit riders. If the service provided by the CTA remains constant across the
network, so that average travel times and out-of-vehicle (transfer, waiting, and access) times
stay roughly the same across the ridership base, then the increase in generalized user cost will
simply be the increase in fares. (This is a conservative estimate, since the CTA would likely trim
some services in response to the ridership decline, thus worsening non-fare travel costs for
existing riders.) If the average fare per trip has increased $0.23, from $0.87 to $1.10, and each of
the remaining 399 million trip-makers bears this increase in cost, then the consumer surplus loss
for 2006 will be $91.1 million.
4.3.3 Trips Shifted
If we assume that 20% of trips are foregone, which is in line with the survey results above,
then the remaining 80% of trip-makers have found alternate travel modes for reaching their
destinations. For these travelers, it is appropriate to use the "rule of one-half" (assuming a
linear demand curve) to estimate their loss in consumer surplus. Assuming again a $0.23
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increase in average fare, the consumer surplus loss to these 39.6 million trip-makers (80% of at
49.5 million total) will be approximately $4.5 million.
4.3.4 Abandoned Trips
Estimating the loss associated with abandoned trips is more challenging. Riders who
completely forego trips following a fare increase are likely to be those who are the poorest and
most transit-dependent in the region, and these situations are harder to analyze within a
standard benefit-cost framework. The value to the rider of her trip is likely to exceed the fare
being charged, but she may face budgetary constraints which prevent her from translating this
value into cash with which to pay the increased fare. We are hesitant to ascribe a particular
dollar value to these lost trips, but they should not be ignored. Even if these abandoned trips
had an intrinsic value of only $1.00 per trip, this would represent a loss to consumers of $10
million in 2006.
4.3.5 Congestion Costs
The shift away from transit potentially has additional congestion costs that will be borne by
existing auto travelers and truck drivers in the region. However, given the dominance of
automobile travel, the number of incremental vehicle miles traveled (VMT) likely to be added to
the Chicago road network, even following a substantial fare increase, is relatively small
compared to overall VMT. Table 4-4 gives an order-of-magnitude estimation of the added daily
VMT that would result. Assuming an average trip length of 5 miles (which is shorter than the
trip length assumed by TTI, but approximately equal to the current average CTA rail trip and
longer than the average CTA bus trip), total daily travel on highways and arterials would
increase by 132,000 vehicle miles per day. This is less than 0.2% of the projected total daily
highway and principal arterial VMT in the region.19
19 This calculation assumes 1% annual growth in highway and principal arterial VMT for 2002-2006,
which is in line with recent historical experience.
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Steady Ridership Level 448,386,000
Ridership With High Fares (Scen. C) 398,870,909
Loss in Annual Unlinked Trips 49,515,091
Average Unlinked Trips Per Linked O-D Trip 1.5
Loss in Linked Trips 33,010,061
Fraction Shifting to New Mode 80%
New Non-Transit Trips 26,408,048
Fraction of Trips Shifting to Incremental Auto Trip 25%
New Auto Trips 6,602,012
Days Per Year* 250
New Daily Auto Trips 26,408
Average Trip Length (mi.) 5
Incremental Daily VMT 132,040
Original Projected Daily Highway and Principal 96,798,000Arterial VMT in Chicago Region
Incremental VMT Increase 0.14%
* Assume all transit trip losses occur on standard work days.
Table 4-4: Increase in 2006 VMT Under Fare Increase Scenario
However, even such a marginal increase may have negative effects on regional welfare.
Using the historical TTI data on VMT and costs of congestion described in Chapter Three, we
can estimate the additional annual costs imposed by this increased travel. Using the parameters
from the OLS regression on the previous ten years of data (which appears more reasonable and
indicates a slightly higher congestion cost for added VMT than the twenty-year sequence), we
can estimate the incremental regional congestion costs that will accompany the fare increase.
Table 4-5 shows this estimated congestion cost (or dis-benefit) for 2006 using a range of
estimates for average trip length and fraction of trip-makers making their trip by "incremental"
auto (i.e., by making a new auto trip, rather than walking, sharing a ride with an existing driver,
etc.).
Clearly, this estimate is very sensitive to assumptions, as we see a four-fold range (from $8
million to $37 million) across fairly plausible parameter choices. Given existing travel patterns
in Chicago, the grey-boxed estimate of $13.4 million (with average trip length of five miles and
25% new auto trips) appears to be the most reasonable. For the purposes of a strategic
evaluation of policy, we believe this level of accuracy is sufficient, but an implementation of
these policies would of course require more detailed travel behavior modeling.
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Fraction of Trips By Average Trip Length (mi.)
"Incremental" Auto 3 5 7
25% $8.0 $13.4 $18.7
50% $16.0 $26.8 $37.4
(figures in millions of 2004 dollars)
Table 4-5: Congestion Costs in 2006 Under Fare Increase Scenario
4.3.6 Air Quality Costs
Assessing the cost of diminished air quality following the fare increase involves even
greater uncertainty than that associated with estimating congestion costs. The range of
"reasonable" costs given by McCubbin and Delucchi (see Chapter Three) covers a greater than
ten-fold difference between low and high estimates. Moreover, modeling of air quality impacts
is even more dependent than congestion modeling on microscopic and site-specific
characteristics (the age and composition of the auto fleet, the climate and season, the health
attributes of the local population, and so forth), and we do not undertake such microscopic
analysis here. However, it will still be instructive to compare estimates of air quality impacts
with more definite changes in consumer welfare (such as fares or travel time) and see if the
orders of magnitude are similar or widely different.
First, however, a few words about the estimates by McCubbin and Delucchi are required. In
the interest of conservatism, so as not to overstate the potential impact, we will focus on their
low range estimates. Despite this, the effects of air pollution will be notable in our overall
benefit/cost estimates. Also, it is significant that the vast majority of human health effects from
motor vehicle pollution come from particulate matter - between 80-90% for gasoline vehicles
and well over 90% for diesel vehicles. This will have an impact in later scenarios where
increases in service provision will put more diesel motor buses on the road in place of gasoline
vehicles.
It is also important to recognize that these estimates are derived from data on the 1990
automotive fleet. The dollar figures must of course be adjusted for inflation, but more
importantly, the average light-duty gasoline vehicle in 2004 produces significantly less
pollution than the average vehicle in 1990. However, these Clean Air Act-mandated
improvements are mitigated by two factors. First, there has been a significant growth since
1990 in the use of trucks and sport utility vehicles as passenger cars, and these vehicles have less
efficient engines which burn more fuel and emit more pollutants per mile. Second, the travelers
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in our scenarios who are most likely to be switching modes between auto and transit are also
likely to be low- or moderate-income. These travelers will also likely use cars that are older and
less well-maintained, and hence more polluting, than the current fleet average. In order to deal
with these effects, we will present two sets of estimates - one using the original (inflation-
adjusted) pollution costs per mile, and one assuming that the average car affected in our various
scenarios is only half as polluting as the average car in 1990. We believe this will cover a
reasonable range of estimates for pollution costs.
As in the congestion calculations above, we project that 25% of shifted trip-makers will
undertake a new automobile trip. In addition, we will assume for simplicity that all new trips
occur in light-duty gasoline vehicles. Table 4-6 presents a range of estimates for the costs of
tailpipe and upstream emissions. Under our "most reasonable" scenario above (and boxed in
grey), and assuming the average vehicle is half as polluting as the average 1990 vehicle, the air
pollution costs under the fare increase scenario are approximately $15 million (in 2004 dollars).
Average Trip Length (mi.)
Average Auto Pollution Level 3 5 7
PM Total PM Total PM Total
Same as 1990 Fleet Average $15.6 $18.4 $26.0 $30.7 $36.4 $42.9
One-Half of 1990 Average $7.8 $9.2 $ .3 $18.2 $21.5
(figures in millions of 2004 dollars)
Table 4-6: Air Pollution Cost Estimates Under Fare Increase Scenario
4.3.7 Evaluation
When we consider both continuing transit riders and lost riders, the loss in consumer
benefit under the higher fares scenario is at least $100 million in 2006. Losses due to increased
road congestion are likely to be in the range of $10-$15 million, while human health costs from
increased air pollution (predominately particulate matter) are of a similar magnitude -
approximately $15 million. All together, the direct costs and the external costs of this shift from
transit to automobiles in response to higher fares are on the order of $130 million by 2006. This
is significantly in excess of the $44 million estimated as the additional public funding needed to
keep average fare revenue and ridership in 2006 constant at their 2003 levels.
The $44 million in public funding is not "free," however. There can be significant
deadweight losses associated with tax collection. In their assessment of transit subsidies,
Savage and Schupp reference Jorgenson and Yun (1991) and estimate an additional cost of
public funds when generated by a sales tax (from the deadweight loss associated with taxation)
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of 26% on top of the amount raised. Using this figure, the total cost of maintaining fare levels
and system ridership increases to $55 million in 2006. Even with this cost included, however,
the ratio of expected benefits to costs of this expenditure is approximately 2:1.
This estimation may in fact understate the costs (or dis-benefits) associated with the
ridership loss. While many travelers who shift their trips away from transit to the automobile
will use existing cars (either carpooling or driving a currently-owned vehicle), some fraction
will actually purchase incremental new automobiles. The overall travel behavior of these
persons (or households) is then likely to change, because the marginal cost of an additional auto
trip is now quite low. Other trips which might previously have been achieved by walking or
sharing a ride now have an auto available, and entirely new trips are also likely to be created.
This induced auto travel will worsen regional congestion and air quality, and the dis-benefits
will thus be larger than those calculated here. However, further research is required to correctly
estimate such effects, and we have not included them here.
4.4 Conclusion
The analysis above makes a strong case that allowing the CTA to descend into financial
crisis, as happened previously in the early 1980s and 1990s, is a poor public policy choice. The
costs (or dis-benefits) to transit riders, auto drivers, and the general population that are likely to
occur are significantly larger than the expenditure required to prevent the crisis. With that
baseline established, we now want to move to the next level and determine the costs and
benefits of further public investment and expenditure to gain transit riders, rather than simply
to hold ridership constant. We explore various scenarios for ridership gain in Chapter Five.
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5 Ridership Growth I: Objectives and Costs
In Chapter Two, we established the motivation for our investigation: that public transit,
even during good economic periods, is serving a declining fraction of trips in U.S. metropolitan
areas, and that this continued shift is due in part to historical and current constraints placed on
transit which are not faced by the automobile. If this trend is to be reversed, and the related
problems of auto and truck congestion addressed, more public expenditure on transit is likely
to be necessary. Then, in Chapter Three, we covered two related frameworks for assessing the
potential gains (or losses) from this hypothesized investment. First, measures of efficiency and
effectiveness were introduced, which serve as internal indicators of transit performance and the
nature of the transit production function. Second, an external cost-benefit framework was
described, where the passenger trips produced by a transit system are translated into benefits
which can then be balanced against the required public expenditures. Finally, in Chapter Four,
we analyzed the current constrained position of the CTA using this framework. We found that
an increase in funding for the CTA in order to stave off an anticipated fare increase would be
justified when the likely benefits in mobility, congestion, and air quality are balanced against
the public costs.
We now want to further develop this general framework and examine in detail the costs and
benefits of using additional public expenditure to not simply hold ridership constant, but to
increase the ridership of public transit in the city of Chicago. More specifically, we want to
answer the following questions:
1) Can we create a system-level (as compared to route-level) methodology - one which
is sensitive to assumptions on both service provision and customer response - for
modeling potential ridership gains in response to additional service provision?
2) Can this model identify investment objectives which are both a net positive for CTA
and fit within existing constraints? And if existing constraints appear to be strongly
limiting with respect to potentially positive expenditures, can we identify
justifications for loosening the constraints?
3) Will the distribution of the benefits be localized within existing transit users or
spread more broadly across residents and businesses in Chicago?
Chapter Five will introduce potential policy objectives and explain the creation of the one-
period cost model, while Chapter Six will explore the accompanying costs and benefits across
time.
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5.1 Possible Objectives
With its many constituencies and social goals, the set of possible objectives for an
incremental public transit investment is very large. We present three here which a) correlate
with the benefits of public transit usually presented by transit agencies and advocates (see, for
example, "The Benefits of Public Transportation" from the American Public Transportation
Association), and b) are plausible goals to emerge out of a public policy process.
5.1.1 Congestion Mitigation
The "Annual Mobility Report" of the Texas Transportation Institute (TTI) analyzes
congestion trends in major metropolitan areas. Using their Travel Time Index, which captures
the amount of additional time needed to make a trip during a typical peak travel period in
comparison to traveling at free-flow speeds, Chicago was ranked in 2001 as having the third-
worst congestion in the country, despite having the nation's second largest transit system. In
the ten years from 1991 to 2001, while population in the metro area grew at a rate of only 0.8%
annually, vehicle miles traveled (VMT) on highways and principal arterials increased at a rate
of 2.7% and per-person hours of delay grew by 4.4% per year. The estimated annual cost of this
congestion to the economy of metro Chicago, counting both lost time and extra fuel, was $4.2
billion in 2001. This is a dead-weight loss to the region, as the lost time cannot be recovered and
the expenditure on fuel (which provides no direct benefit to the consumer) could re-allocated to
other goods. Therefore, one appealing public policy target is the diversion of incremental VMT
growth into public transit in order to prevent further growth in congestion costs.
5.1.2 Household Transportation Expenditures
The average consumer unit (roughly a household) in the Chicago metro area spent
approximately 14% of its income on transportation expenditures in 2001-02. This fraction has
not changed significantly over the previous decade, decreasing slightly from 1991-92 as Table
5-1 indicates.20 Yet even in a transit-friendly area like Chicago, only 1% of income is spent on
20 However, the composition of that spending on transportation, when analyzed in real terms, has shifted.
As real household income grew 21.6% over the period, transportation spending lagged, growing only
14.6%. But real net outlays on automobiles increased by 36% in the period, far ahead of real income
growth. Households were able to afford some combination of additional automobiles and more
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public transportation, and the bulk of transport spending goes to the purchase, maintenance,
and insurance of private automobiles. This spending pattern has two potentially negative
implications. First, expenditures on autos and petroleum products are likely to leave the
Chicago region - to other regions and other countries - and thus be unavailable to have a
multiplier effect on the Chicago economy. Second, income which must be spent on
transportation cannot be used for housing and other consumer purchases. This relationship has
recently been formalized by the Location Efficient Mortgage (LEM), a financial product
developed in conjunction with the Center for Neighborhood Technology, which gives potential
home-buyers in transit-rich neighborhoods additional borrowing power because their expected
annual transportation expenses are lower. Thus, a second possible policy objective for transit is
reduction of household transportation expenditures.
Consumer Expenditure Category 1991-92 2001-02
Number of Consumer Units (000) 3,227 3,072
Income Before Taxes $39,106 $61,853
Average Number in Consumer Unit
Persons 2.8 2.8
Vehicles 1.6 1.7
Percent Homeowner 63 69
Average Annual Expenditures $34,105 $47,861
Food $4,867 $5,934
Housing $11,160 $17,239
Transportation $5,751 $8,571
Vehicle purchases (net outlay) 2,296 4,061
Gasoline and motor oil 1,011 1,327
Other vehicle expenses 1,926 2,476
Public transportation 518 707
Transportation % of Income 14.7% 13.9%
Vehicle purchases (net outlay) 5.9% 6.6%
Gasoline and motor oil 2.6% 2.1%
Other vehicle expenses 4.9% 4.0%
Public transportation 1.3% 1.1%
Table 5-1: Consumer Expenditures in Chicago (Nominal Dollars)
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expensive automobiles because their average real expenditures on fuel, insurance, maintenance, and
other vehicle expenses were essentially constant over the period.
5.1.3 Ridership Gain
The postwar history of the CTA is characterized by periods of relatively flat ridership
punctuated by shorter periods with substantial decreases in patronage. In 2002, CTA carried
approximately 455 million unlinked trips on its bus and rail networks. This represents a drop of
approximately 15% from its level of 1991, when the CTA experienced a sharp ridership decline
in conjunction with the national recession. Many Chicago politicians and business advocates
(such as the Chicago Metropolis 2020 group) would like to reverse these postwar trends.
Moreover, at the national level, the Federal Transit Administration has set a goal of 2% annual
growth in transit ridership. While many smaller transit providers may actually be able to grow
faster than this, the sheer size of the transit agencies in New York, Chicago, and the other major
cities requires that they grow at nearly this rate in order to achieve the national goal. Thus, a
third potential public policy goal is recapture of previous ridership levels and a reversal of the
continued decline in transit mode share.
5.1.4 Effectiveness of Fare Reductions?
Throughout this analysis, we will essentially consider fare levels as an exogenous constraint
on the CTA and focus instead on the costs and benefits of service expansion. In the short-term,
this is not an unreasonable assumption, as explicit political constraints (RTA fare recovery
requirements) prevent fare reductions and implicit constraints (voter unhappiness) prevent
frequent or sizable fare increases. However, it will be instructive to briefly look at the costs and
benefits of the various investment scenarios and see if a comparable amount of public funding
used for fare reductions would have a comparable effect on achieving the stated policy
objectives.
5.2 Methodology
Figure 5-1 illustrates the basic flow of the investment process and shows the causal links
between the major components of the model. For a given incremental amount of public
investment, additional service can be provided by the buses and trains. (If this service is being
provided in the off-peak, the funding may go only for operations, while a proposal for added
peak service may require additional capital funds for vehicle purchases. This distinction will be
examined in greater detail.) This new service should draw additional riders onto the transit
system, and the consumer response to the increased level of service is likely to vary across time
period and mode. In addition, these new transit trips may be travelers switching from
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automobile, or switching from a non-motorized mode such as walking, or even undertaking
entirely new trips. From this breakdown of amount and source of new riders, we can estimate
the benefits flowing from the proposed investment.
Benefits (Original
New Public Added Service RidershipPoiyOjcve
Expenditure Provision (RVM) Changes
< Benefits
(Additional)
Figure 5-1: Schematic of Causal Relationships
However, despite the causal relationship which flows left-to-right above, we will approach
the actual cost and benefit estimation in reverse. That is, in order to meet the stated policy
objective, we will determine the ridership changes required to achieve it, and then the added
service and public expenditure required to generate that ridership. Once those costs and
benefits have been established, we can then add in the "additional" benefits which will accrue
from the investment to complete the picture - and those benefits could be substantial relative to
the original policy objective.
5.3 Ridership Generation Model
The analysis would be greatly simplified if we could take the internal performance measure
'operating subsidy per passenger' and use it as a ridership generation parameter. In 2002, for
example, the CTA reported public operating funding per trip of $0.97 on a ridership base of
approximately 457 million passenger trips. If ridership creation were simply a matter of
"scaling up" the existing operating system (abstracting for the moment from any physical or
financial constraints), then a hypothetical 1% increase in trips carried would require an
incremental public expenditure of only $4.4 million - a modest investment representing only
0.6% of the operating funding supplied by the RTA in the 2003 budget.
Of course, such an approach does not generate a realistic cost projection, but only a very
loose lower bound estimate. The subsidy-per-passenger measure speaks only to the average
performance across the transit network, hiding not only differences across mode and time of
day, but also giving no information about marginal changes in cost and ridership, which are the
focus here.
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A finely detailed ridership generation model, one which would be applicable directly for
agency planning, is beyond the scope of this investigation. In particular, such a model would
require route-by-route examination of ridership patterns, transfer behavior, and timetable
creation, among many other factors. Instead, we desire a model with a number of broad yet
sensitive components which can help us gauge whether particular policy objectives are worthy
of further examination. The model will focus on six major areas: mode split; peak vs. off-peak
ridership; service elasticity (i.e., ridership response with respect to increased levels of service);
operating costs; vehicle fleet size and capital costs; and average fare revenue.
5.3.1 Mode Split
Buses provide the majority of passenger transit trips in Chicago, as noted earlier. Table 5-2
below shows the modal split between bus and rail for Chicago and the three peer agencies from,
with Houston METRO having only bus service (other services such as paratransit are omitted
here). Two points are immediately clear from these data:
- Chicago provides significantly more bus service - and carries fewer rail passengers -
than its two peers which have both bus and rail networks. The grid street network of
Chicago, which supports cross-town (non-radial) bus trips, has a strong influence on this
service pattern.
- The average rail trip is approximately twice as long as the average bus trip in Chicago
and Washington, DC. If modal split is measured by passenger miles rather than
passenger trips, then the picture shifts considerably, with rail holding a 55% share in
Chicago. Houston bus trips are similar in length to Chicago and Washington, DC, rail
trips, while Boston has much shorter average rail trips - a result of its dense urban form
and its heavily-used light rail line.
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Mode Split and Trip City Agency) Washington, DC
Length (2002) Boston (MBTA) Chicago (CTA) Houston (Metro) (WMATA)
Passengers (000)
Bus 108,692 32% 303,295 63% 94,778 100% 147,771 38%
Rail 235,045 68% 180,400 37% 242,794 62%
Passenger Miles (000)
Bus 290,169 28% 807,540 45% 542,157 100% 450,769 24%
Rail 734,892 72% 995,621 55% 1,438,336 76%
Average Trip Length
Bus 2.7 2.7 5.7 3.1
Rail 3.1 5.5 5.9
Note: Rail figures for MBTA include both heavy and light rail.
Table 5-2: Mode Split and Trip Length
In this model, we will measure mode split using passenger figures, but the average trip
length will be important when calculating benefits (e.g., vehicle miles removed from the
roadway). Mode split will prove to be an important choice variable - will the agency simple
"scale up" its existing system as it attempts to grow ridership, or will it target investment in a
particular mode?
5.3.2 Peak/Off-Peak Ridership
Contrary to the perception (and reality) of transit in many cities, the CTA is not
predominately a rush-hour service provider. According to internal market research,
approximately 48% of all weekday trips on the CTA occur during the six peak hours (6-9 AM
and 3-6 PM), with another one-third occurring in the mid-day and the rest during early
morning, evening, or night owl periods. This service pattern is also reflected in the peak-to-
base ratio, shown earlier in Chapter Three. The CTA's peak-to-base ratio is low compared to its
peers, which indicates a relatively strong provision of off-peak service and more efficient usage
of its vehicles across the day.
As with mode split, the choice of peak versus off-peak investment will be important for the
agency, and the correct choice may not be obvious. Demand elasticities are likely to be higher
in the off-peak (i.e., passengers will respond more strongly to an increase in service), and the
agency should be able to provide additional service without new capital outlays. However, the
benefits of congestion mitigation will be significantly lower in the off-peak, thus raising doubts
about the efficacy of the investment in reaching this policy objective.
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5.3.3 Demand Elasticity
Customer response to additional service is a crucial component of the model. Yet there
continues to be a lack of consensus in the transit industry about appropriate values for ridership
elasticities. There are a number of issues:
* Shifts in ridership rarely occur in a "vacuum" where fares or service levels - that is,
factors which are under the control of the transit agency - are the only parameters which
change. Subsequent elasticity analysis can be confounded by economic, demographic,
and technological changes that are difficult to identify.
- Many of the most detailed elasticity studies were performed during the 1970s when
transit systems (both bus and rail) were expanding in response to growing state and
federal investment. The growth in real income and auto ownership since that period has
made the ridership base for transit less "captive," which may indicate that current
customer response will be more elastic. However, changes in location patterns
(employment, shopping, etc.) which have occurred, and which favor the automobile,
may counteract that change. The balance between these factors is unclear.
- Short- and long-run demand elasticities may be substantially different, with short-run
customer response expected to be more inelastic. For simplification purposes, we will
assume only a single value, but this fact could potentially be troublesome for a transit
agency. If customers are initially slow to respond to an improvement in service, the
agency may feel pressure to retrench and cut the service back to its original level. This
may further dampen customer responsiveness to service changes as households and
employers feel they cannot make long-term location choices with confidence about
transit service.
Given the scope of the public policy objectives outlined above, we are clearly considering
more than simply lengthened hours on some bus routes or an improvement in off-peak
frequency on the elevated trains. Instead, we are considering a comprehensive service expansion.
Such an expansion will ultimately be measured as an increase in revenue vehicle miles, but it
could include a mix of expanded hours, increased frequencies, coverage in new areas, and
introduction of express services.
The recent TCRP report "Traveler Response to Transportation System Changes" provides
the most inclusive overview of ridership studies on U.S. transit properties, and they find that
the traveler response to service expansion can vary widely. Ordinary service elasticities with
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respect to bus miles or bus hours are in the range of +0.6 to +1.0, but elasticities greater than
+1.0 and as low as +0.3 are not uncommon. The tables below (Table 5-3 to Table 5-5), which are
adapted from that report, show service elasticities for various transit providers across varying
time frames:
city 1970 UZA Years Increase in Increase in ServicePopulation Bus Miles Ridership Elasticity
Minneapolis, MN * 1,700,000 1971-1975 47.3% 39.6% 0.86
Seattle, WA 1,240,000 1974-1975 9.6% 8.3% 0.87
Miami, FL * 1,220,000 1972-1975 12.5% 10.9% 0.88
San Diego, CA 1,200,000 1974-1975 20.1% 13.3% 0.68
Portland, OR * 820,000 1971-1975 42.5% 36.4% 0.88
Vancouver, BC * 740,000 1971-1975 77.6% 56.8% 0.78
Salt Lake City, UT * 480,000 1971-1975 117.8% 118.4% 1.00
Madison, WI 210,000 1974-1975 7.6% 8.9% 1.16
Bakersfield, CA 180,000 1974-1977 50.8% 49.0% 0.97
Raleigh, NC 150,000 1976-1977 28.6% 10.9% 0.41
Eugene, OR * 140,000 1972-1975 166.5% 271.3% 1.34
Average 0.89
Asterisk denotes period including 1973-1974 gasoline shortages.
Table 5-3: Bus Service Expansions (Short Time Frame)
FY1991-96 Revenue e199196 ServiceAgency (City) Miles Growth Ridership ElasticityGrowth
Miami-Dade Transit 9.37% 8.63% 0.9(Miami, FL)
Table 5-4: Service Expansion (Medium Time Frame)
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Montgomery County Ride-On Santa Clara Valley Transit Authority
(Maryland) (California)
Parameter 1977 1997 Change or 1977 1997 Change or
Elasticity Elasticity
Service 606,000 Bus 8,974,000 Bus +1381% 657,000 Bus 1,408,000 Bus +114%Miles Miles Hours Hours
Unlinked Bus Passenger 966,000 17,433,000 +1705% 15,600,000 45,890,000 +194%Trips
Elasticity +1.07 +1.42
Population 581,000 828,000 +42% 1,224,000 1,653,000 +35%
Employment 268,000 477,000 +78% 544,000 933,000 +72%
Elasticity (Passengers +0.94 +1.02Per Capita) I II
Table 5-5: Bus Service Expansion (Long Time Frame)
In general, larger metropolitan areas - which usually have better levels of coverage - show
smaller customer response (lower elasticity) than smaller metropolitan areas. In addition,
changes in service frequency alone tend to result in lower elasticities (closer to +0.5), while
extensions to underserved areas and introductions of express services have more elastic
responses. Given the age and existing coverage of Chicago's network, a conservative initial
estimation for the value of service elasticity is in order. The experience of San Diego - a service
elasticity with respect to bus miles of +0.68 - is near the bottom of the range of experiences
considered here and seems appropriate.
However, we also expect that off-peak service elasticity will be higher than that for peak
service, as off-peak riders generally have more flexibility in their travel behavior (departure
time, destination, etc.). One study of service changes in 30 British cities found off-peak service
elasticities of +0.76 on average, while peak-hour elasticities were 25% lower, averaging only
+0.58. Such a relationship seems reasonable for Chicago as well, though we should not
discount the possibility that targeted increases on particular peak service (e.g. lakeshore express
routes) might have a more elastic customer response.
Finally, we consider elasticities for rail rapid transit. The opportunities for service
improvement on rail are much more limited than those for bus, and generally consist of fare
changes and minor schedule or frequency modifications. Therefore, there is much less
experience to draw on when estimating customer response. Overall, we expect customer
response to rail transit to be more inelastic than for bus - initial service levels are already
higher, and comparable options may be less available. One study of London found rail transit
service elasticities to be approximately half those of bus, which is generally the finding for fare
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elasticities across rail and bus as well. In the absence of stronger information, we will use this
result, but it will be important to test the sensitivity of the model on this point.
The inability of rail transit to offer service improvements is especially true during the peak
period, when rail systems in large, older cities are likely to be operating at or near their safe
capacity limits. 21 Only massive infrastructure investments are able to have a significant impact
on rail capacity, and Chicago is currently undertaking two New Start capital projects which will
ultimately do that. The rehabilitation of the Douglas Blue Line branch will eliminate a number
of slow zones, which will allow increased service, and the expansion of the Brown Line stations
to accommodate eight-car (rather than six-car) trains will increase carrying capacity without a
noticeable increase in operating cost. However, these projects are already well underway, and
while a number of additional rail expansion projects have been mooted (extensions for a
number of lines, the proposed Circle Line, etc.), they are many years away and beyond the
scope of this investigation.
5.3.4 Operating Costs
In 2002, the CTA incurred heavy rail operating expenses of $359 million and motorbus
operating expenses of $560 million, as shown in Table 5-6. For this model, we can divide these
figures into variable costs of operation and maintenance, which fluctuate directly with service
output, and fixed costs of non-vehicle maintenance and general administration, which will be
roughly constant in response to service changes.
Variable Vehicle
Mode Revenue Costs (000) Non-Vehicle Maint. Total (000) VariableMiles (000) Operations Maintenance & Admin (000) Cost/RVM
Heavy Rail 61,532.7 $154,820.9 $52,540.9 $151,660.5 $359,022.2 $3.37
Motorbus 65,901.1 $336,280.5 $115,705.5 $107,697.6 $559,683.7 $6.86
Table 5-6: 2002 CTA Operating Costs
A more detailed cost model which analyzed specific cost drivers and created separate
variable cost estimates across network components (e.g., accounting for the higher average
labor cost of adding bus trips during the peak) would be required for an agency planning
21 Operations staff at the CTA indicated in discussions that the Red and Brown Line elevated trains (the
two most heavily used lines in Chicago), are operating at maximum train throughput during the peak
and often face passenger load levels at or above capacity.
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model. We assume, however, that for a comprehensive service expansion as proposed here, a
constant-returns-to-scale production is available, and thus a system-wide cost average is
sufficient for the model. We also assume that the expansion can be modeled equally well by
revenue miles or revenue hours, and we choose to use revenue miles.22 From these
assumptions, we see that each additional revenue vehicle mile on the bus network will cost the
CTA $6.86, while each additional rail revenue mile will cost $3.37. Again, it will be important to
test the sensitivity of these assumptions.
5.3.5 Vehicle Fleet Size and Cost
The CTA reported 1,719 bus vehicles during its maximum (peak) service period during
2003. If peak hour revenue miles are to be increased, absent significant operational changes,
then additional buses will have to be purchased. The cost of purchasing a new bus varies
widely depending on the size, propulsion, special features (e.g. graffiti-resistant windows), and
number of buses purchased. A CTA press release from January of 2000 indicates that the
average new purchase price of standard transit buses (regular diesel engine, 40-foot, air-
conditioned, low-floor) under a competitively bid contract with Nova BUS Inc. was $239,000.
We assume that each new bus required to achieve the policy objectives will cost $250,000.
The CTA operated 1,020 rail transit vehicles during maximum service in 2003. However, as
with the peak hour capacity constraint on the rail network, the ability of the CTA to simply
purchase incremental rail transit vehicles is heavily constrained. In 2004, a request for proposal
(RFP) will be released and bids will be solicited for new AC-powered rail transit cars.
However, these cars would not even start being delivered until 2008. In short, the amount of
additional peak hour rail service which is likely to be added to the CTA network is minimal.
For the sake of preliminary modeling, we will estimate the cost of an additional rail transit car
to be $800,000.
5.3.6 Average Fare Revenue
Average farebox revenue per trip in Chicago was relatively constant from 2000 to 2003,
staying tightly within a range of $0.82 to $0.84 as compared to the non-discounted standard fare
of $1.50. This takes into account transfers, the discounts offered to certain groups of travelers,
and the purchase of passes by frequent users. With the recently implemented fare changes
2 As noted in Chapter Two, revenue seat-miles would be the preferred measure if it were readily
available, but nearly all data are given in revenue hours or revenue miles.
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(standard fare raised to $1.75 and transfers reduced to $0.25), the projected average fare in 2004
rises to $0.87. We assume for simplicity that this will remain essentially unchanged in response
to the comprehensive service expansion.
5.3.7 Source of Ridership
If the policy objective is simply to grow overall transit ridership, then the source of the new
riders who respond to the service improvements is immaterial, though it will be important
when measuring the total benefits of the investment to judge its overall worthiness. However,
if we are interested in offering new service with the specific goal of removing automobile trips
from the roadway, then an important assumption is the fraction of new transit trips which are
drawn from the auto and the fraction which are new motorized trips (either shift from walking
or entirely new). The experience in this regard varies widely, but in his paper on evaluating
transit subsidies in Chicago, Savage notes that ridership surveys found that 51.7% of new transit
trips on the Orange Line following its opening were originally automobile trips. Following
Savage, we will assume that 50% of new transit trips generated in the model are mode shifters
from the auto.
In addition, most transit data sources deal in unlinked passenger trips - that is, counting
each instance a passenger gets on a different transit vehicle as a new trip. This over-counts the
number of actual origin-to-destination trips in the network, since many passengers must
transfer as part of their transit journey. (This is one of the major service advantages of the
automobile, and many transit agencies are attempting to redistribute service in order to provide
"one seat rides" for as many passengers as possible.) The CTA, with its grid network and high
number of bus riders, is an especially transfer-dependent system. Market research by the
agency indicates that approximately 50% of passengers transfer as part of their trip. Thus, we
will estimate that every three new unlinked trips generated on the network represent two
origin-destination trips.
5.4 Cost Estimates
We now consider the three potential policy objectives outlined above. Before undertaking a
detailed examination of their benefits, we want to estimate overall costs and see if the projects
fit within reasonable economic and political constraints.
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5.4.1 Diversion of Peak VMT Growth
The Texas Transportation Institute (TTI) estimated 2001 daily vehicle miles traveled (VMT)
on highways and principal arterials in the Chicago metro area at 92.1 million miles per day.
Growth in VMT has slowed somewhat from its high rate in the early 1990s, averaging
approximately 1.6% annually between 1997 and 2001 and only 1.0% from 1999-2001. If we
assume a continued annual growth rate of 1.0% from 2002 onward, and also assume that
roughly 50% of the growth will be during the peak hour, the incremental peak daily VMT
increase in 2005 will be approximately 0.47 million miles. TTI assumes average auto occupancy
of 1.25 people and an average trip length of nine miles, implying a peak hour increase in daily
person trips of 65,000. It is these trips which would need to be captured by public transit in
order to divert peak VMT growth.
The area covered by the TTI analysis is the entire Chicago metropolitan area, which is
significantly larger than the service area of CTA and includes the service areas of Pace and
Metra. CTA currently carries approximately 80% of the transit trips in the region, and we
assume for simplicity that the three RTA service boards would capture these new trips in the
same proportion. For the CTA, that means 52,000 new auto-shift trips per day. Given the
ridership source assumptions above, the CTA would need to provide sufficient new service to
draw 104,000 new linked transit trips in order for half of those trips to be auto-shift. Assuming
then that half of these new linked trips will require a transfer, the total number of new daily
unlinked trips on the CTA would be 156,000.
When we consider that the current daily ridership of the CTA is only 1,500,000 unlinked
trips, we see the challenge this seemingly plausible policy objective presents. Achieving this
goal would require a ridership increase of over 10% in the first year alone. Just the physical and
managerial constraints - finding sufficient vehicles and operators to support such rapid growth
- are too great, to say nothing of the financial costs. These constraints are unlikely to be
loosened, and we clearly must set our policy objectives somewhat lower.
This raises a larger question about using transit as a congestion mitigation strategy, a claim
which is often made on its behalf. Especially in cities with rail rapid transit, most bus service is
not oriented towards high demand corridors, but instead serves feeder and cross-town routes.
Clearly this is not universally true, and all agencies offer some express bus services - the
lakeshore express routes in Chicago are an excellent example. In general, however, buses in
most metro areas create accessibility but don't act significantly on congestion reduction.
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Congestion reduction comes instead from rail rapid transit and commuter rail, which tend to
run in demand corridors parallel to more heavily traveled highways and major arterials2
The problem from a policy perspective, then, is that additional rail carrying capacity (either
rapid transit or commuter) in the peak hour is unavailable in the near term for many metro
areas, including Chicago, Boston, and Washington. Significant extra peak-hour capacity -
enough to draw off a noticeable fraction of VMT from the most crowded roadways -- would
require huge capital investments, which are unlikely, and take many years to be delivered. This
is not to claim that existing rail capacity does not reduce road congestion - certainly it is crucial
during the peak hours. But the ability of public transit as currently structured - given bus
network structure and rail network capacity - to deliver incremental peak-hour congestion
reduction via endogenous expansion is questionable.
5.4.2 Ridership Recapture
A goal of slow but consistent overall ridership growth - in line with the FTA objectives -
seems more plausible for a large, established property like the CTA. An objective to return to
1991 ridership levels within 10 years would require year-over-year ridership increases of
approximately 1.5%. At this point in time, there are few obvious economic or social factors in
Chicago - demographic shifts, changes in automobile pricing, etc. - that would drive such
growth exogenously. Therefore, we will assume for simplicity that demand for transit stays
relatively constant and any growth in ridership comes from endogenous improvements in the
supply of transit.
Table 5-11 ("Scenario I: Constant Expansion"), given at the end of this chapter, shows the
cost modeling for the first year of growth at this rate given the model assumptions described
above. This version describes a "scaling up" of the current CTA network, with ridership
fractions by mode and by peak/off-peak maintained at their current levels. Table 5-12
("Scenario II: Targeted Growth") then shows a more realistic alternative strategy with a greater
fraction of the investment directed at buses (resulting in 80% of the new rides coming on the
bus network) and no additional service offered by peak-hour rail rapid transit.
Scenario I makes clear that scaling up the existing network is a highly unlikely strategy for
the CTA. Assuming that the ridership increases would occur concurrently with the added
23 Thus, Metra's proposed STAR line, which would provide suburb-to-suburb connections in western
Cook and DuPage counties and would require a substantial use of regional capital funds, has unclear
congestion mitigation capabilities.
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service (a very strong assumption which we will relax in the following chapter), a 1.6% increase
in annual ridership (7.2 million unlinked trips) would require additional operating subsidy of
$20.3 million, an increase of 4.5% over 2003 RTA funding. The marginal farebox recovery ratio
on this added service (the ratio of fare revenue to operating expense) would be only 24%, well
below the 50% ratio required by the RTA. Moreover, the estimated capital costs associated with
this strategy are simply not realistic for the CTA. The expansion of peak-hour bus service
would require the purchase of approximately 55 new buses, at an estimated total cost of $13.8
million. While this is perhaps achievable, the projected 6% increase in peak-hour rail miles is
implausible, both financially (requiring 65 new railcars at a cost of $52 million) and
operationally.
A sensitivity analysis (Table 5-13) on two crucial variables - demand elasticity and unit costs
per revenue mile - shows that this conclusion is robust even to significant changes in the
parameters. For example, a 50% lower value of ridership elasticity, which may not be
unreasonable for a dense network like Chicago where the service changes are likely to focus
more on frequency improvement rather than new area coverage, leads to a ballooning of the
required subsidy. (The estimated rail car investment, not shown here, becomes even more
unrealistic.) In fact, in order to approach the required 50% recovery ratio, estimated demand
elasticity would have to increase by 50% (actually becoming elastic for bus in the off-peak) and
unit costs for the new service would have to fall by 25%. Clearly, a more reasonable strategy
than a straight expansion of the current system must be investigated.
Scenario II presents such a strategy. With the same overall objective of a 1.6% increase in
ridership, bus investment is emphasized in this scenario, with 80% of the new riders generated
on bus (half in the peak and half in the off-peak) and no expansion of peak rail service. This
approach requires an incremental public operating subsidy of $15.9 million. The additional rail
capital costs are zero, while the proposed expansion of the bus fleet by 69 vehicles would
require initial capital expenditure of $17.3 million. As with the original scenario, however, even
this targeted investment fails to meet the required farebox recovery ratio, reaching only 28%.
Table 5-14 shows the sensitivity of this model, and again heroic assumptions are required about
both cost reduction and demand responsiveness in order to approach recovery of 50% of costs.
However, we have only so far considered the costs of the investment and not the benefits.
This scenario of targeted investment, while failing to meet one of the (somewhat arbitrary)
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budgetary constraints of the RTA, is certainly plausible and might provide enough benefits to
be justified. We will examine the benefits of this scenario in the next chapter.
5.4.3 Reduction in Household Expenditures
Finally, rather than simply growing ridership for its own sake, we might make investments
with a more explicit objective in mind. Table 5-7 below shows the 2004 estimates by AAA for
the average cost of owning and operating a new car in the U.S. (The hypothetical car is a
composite of three well-known American cars in various price ranges.) Of course, there are
regional variations in insurance and fuel costs, but these figures provide a reasonable
benchmark. Clearly, for low- and moderate-income households, auto ownership and operation
can be a significant expense. According to calculations by the Department of Housing and
Urban Development following the 2000 Census, a family of four in the Chicago metro area is
considered low-income if their annual household income is below $30,700, and they are
considered very low-income if it falls below $18,400. In the city of Chicago proper, more than
one-third (37%) of the population lives in a low-income household, and more than 22% are in
very low income households. An improvement in transit service which allowed these
households to shift their travel behavior in order to drive their existing cars less or own fewer
cars would offer great benefits to those households.
Annual Per-Mile
Miles/Year 15,000
Total Costs $8,431 $0.562
Fixed Costs
Depreciation $3,782
Insurance $1,603
Finance Charges $741
Other $415
Variable Costs
Fuel $975 $0.065
Maintenance $915 $0.061
Table 5-7: AAA Car Ownership Costs
The distinction between the fixed and variable costs of auto ownership is crucial. Once an
automobile has been purchased, the pure variable cost of operation is actually quite low - using
the AAA figures, a five mile auto trip (the average length of a rail transit trip in Chicago) has a
pure out-of-pocket operating costs of less than $0.65, well below the standard one-trip transit
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fare in Chicago and most cities. The only other out-of-pocket cost which is likely to shift the
behavior of a driver who already owns a car is parking.
Many studies have demonstrated that changes in parking fees can have a strong impact on
traveler behavior and mode choice. Parking demand elasticities with respect to an area-wide
price increase are usually in the range of -0.1 to -0.6, with -0.3 cited commonly. However, this
single figure masks more complicated behavior by different classes of travelers. Shoppers and
off-peak travelers are generally able to adjust the duration of their parking in response to a price
increase, rather than shifting mode or eliminating the trip. Peak hour commuters, conversely,
cannot adjust duration significantly, and so either pay the full new price or shift modes. It is
this dynamic which allows public policies such as "parking cash-out" - where employers who
subsidize employee parking offer a cash equivalent to those who choose to ride transit - to be
successful. However, even the effect of parking taxes and price increases on transit ridership is
not necessarily so strong. A TCRP review of studies in Los Angeles found that across eight
cases where workplace parking pricing had been implemented, the average decline in mode
share for single-occupant vehicles was a substantial 13%. However, the countervailing increase
in high occupancy vehicle (HOV) mode share was 9%, with transit garnering only a three
percentage point increase. (Of course, transit quality in Los Angeles would be judged by most
observers to be well below that of Chicago and other large cities.)
Unfortunately, the results generated above for ridership recapture speak to the difficulty of
achieving this goal by way of addition of incremental transit service. In the 'Targeted
Investment' strategy above, the average operating expense per unlinked passenger trip
generated is approximately $3.50. Consider a hypothetical auto driver who, in response to the
new service, replaces her one-way auto commuting trip of six miles (which would be longer
than the existing average CTA trip) with one and a half unlinked transit trips. If she continues
to own the car for non-work trips, then only variable costs are being saved. The average daily
operating costs for the CTA to provide her this round-trip are $10.50, while the variable
automobile costs saved are only $1.50. In order for this "buy back" to make sense, the parking
cost avoided must have been at least $9.00. That is, if the public policy concern is primarily to
assist households with transportation expenses, it would be more effective to simply subsidize
households for those expenses directly unless the parking cost avoided were greater than $9.00.
Yet it is exactly those travelers who are already paying this sort of market rate for parking who
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are extremely unlikely to be induced to switch to transit simply because of a modest increase in
service availability.
There are hypothetically much larger gains to be had, as the ownership costs indicate, from
inducing or allowing households to own fewer cars. But the ability of incremental investments
in service to effect changes in auto ownership levels for existing households appears minimal
if, as we have modeled above, the increased service comes predominately on the bus side and in
off-peak rail on existing lines. In general, the ability of transit to influence auto ownership and
property values - a redistribution of the actual or perceived benefits of the service from
travelers to property owners - is generally limited to heavy or light rail infrastructure. (See, for
example, Diaz 1999 for a recent summary of changes in property values following rail transit
construction.) In addition, auto ownership and income are highly correlated. The journey-to-
work mode share for rail rapid transit is relatively insensitive to income, and the share for
commuter rail actually rises with income. But bus patronage is strongly negatively correlated
with income and is dominated by riders from households with zero or one car (TCRP, Ch 10). It
is simply not plausible to expect reductions in auto ownership from the types of improvements
proposed above. Again, this does not mean that existing transit service does not provide
significant mobility for those households who have fewer automobiles, either by choice or by
necessity. Nor does it mean that small changes in auto expenditure patterns should not be
counted as ancillary benefits. But it appears that we cannot choose this as a dominant public
policy goal.
5.5 Fare Reductions
We have so far focused on increasing ridership and achieving public policy goals through
added transit service provision. We now turn to the possibility of achieving such gains by
means of fare reductions. Current political and budgetary realities in metropolitan Chicago
make a fare reduction for the general ridership base fairly unlikely. (Mandated reductions for
groups such as the elderly and high school students are already in place, and targeted programs
such as discounts on weekend passes for tourists are much smaller and more politically
palatable.) However, it is still instructive to get a rough estimate of the cost of growing
ridership through fare reductions.
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5.5.1 Fare Reduction Estimate
Fare elasticities for public transit are a much-investigated subject, and a survey of the
literature provides a wide range of estimates. However, for this analysis, a rough figure is
sufficient. The TCRP "Traveler Response..." Handbook reports that a demand elasticity of
-0.25 with respect to fares is probably a reasonable estimate for a large system with both bus
and heavy rail transit. This implies that fares would have to fall approximately 6.4% in order to
generate the 1.6% ridership increase proposed above. This assumes that fare elasticities are
relatively symmetric, which may not necessarily be the case since most empirical evidence in
the transit industry comes from price increases rather than decreases. We then make two strong
assumptions:
1) Fare reductions are operationally costless, both in terms of implementation and in
terms of not requiring any alteration to service provision when ridership increases.
This is relatively unobjectionable in the off-peak, but is unrealistic in the peak, when
frequencies on high-demand routes would likely need to be increased.
2) We can directly apply the calculated fare reduction percentage to the 'average fare
per unlinked trip' measure. This is unlikely to be exactly the case, as Chapter Four
demonstrated, since increases in base fares are often accompanied by off-setting
changes in transfer or monthly pass prices, and passengers can also modify their
purchasing behavior in response to fare changes.
Using these very broad assumptions and assuming that ridership on the network simply
"scales up," we find that a first year ridership increase of 1.6% would require additional public
subsidy of approximately $19.3 million to make up for the loss in farebox revenue. (See Table
5-8.) This is coincidentally quite close to the operating funding required in Scenario I above,
and it requires no capital funding. But it is unrealistic in not recognizing that peak service
needs will increase if service standards are to be maintained, and also that ridership response is
generally more inelastic in the peak.
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Estimate of overall fare elasticity in
system w/ significant rail -0.25
Desired ridership increase 1.6%
Required fare decrease -6.4%
Current average fare $0.87
Required fare $0.81
Previous riders 452,000,000
Previous fare revenue $393,240,000
New riders 459,232,000
New fare revenue $373,961,802
Subsidy shortfall $19,278,198
Table 5-8: Systemwide Fare Reduction
The Victoria Transport Policy Institute reports that the fare elasticities in Table 5-9 were
determined for transit service in Chicago. We can use these estimates to model the cost of an
off-peak fare discount as a tool for increasing ridership. If we further assume that the cross-
elasticity between peak and off-peak ridership is relatively low at +0.1, then we can make an
estimate of the off-peak discount required to generate an overall ridership growth of 1.6%.
Mode/Period Fare Elasticities Bus Rail
Peak -0.30 -0.10
Off-Peak -0.46 -0.46
Assumed peak to off-peak cross-elasticity 0.1
Table 5-9: Chicago Fare Elasticities (from VTPI)
As Table 5-10 shows, an off-peak fare reduction of 10% would be slightly more than
sufficient - this would reduce peak ridership by 1.0% but generate a 4.6% increase in off-peak
patronage. In order to make up the lost farebox revenue, a public subsidy of $13.9 million
would be required. This situation can more plausibly claim to have no capital costs associated
with it, and in fact would have a side benefit of modestly reducing crowding during peak
periods. This is an intriguing finding, but it has two problems. First, ridership increases solely
in the off-peak are unlikely to provide as many regional benefits, as we will see in the following
chapter. Second, the CTA has strongly resisted differential peak and off-peak pricing (as is
found in Washington, DC). Nonetheless, an off-peak discount could be a more cost-effective
way to achieve a one-time increase in ridership, if recovery ratio constraints and fare policies
were relaxed. It might particularly make sense if an overall fare increase is required.
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Bus Rail Total % Change
Original Ridership
Peak 144,640,000 72,320,000 216,960,000
Off-Peak 156,693,333 78,346,667 235,040,000
Total 301,333,333 150,666,667 452,000,000
Assumed Revenue $393,240,000
Ridership Response to Fare Reduction
Peak -0.010 -0.010
Off-Peak 0.046 0.046
Ridership Increase/Decrease
Peak (1,446,400) (723,200) (2,169,600) -1.0%
Off-Peak 7,207,893 3,603,947 10,811,840 4.6%
Total 5,761,493 2,880,747 8,642,240 1.9%
Average Fare
Peak $0.87 $0.87
Off-Peak $0.78 $0.78
Revenue Following Fare Reduction
Peak $124,578,432 $62,289,216 $186,867,648
Off-Peak $128,334,660 $64,167,330 $192,501,991
Total $252,913,092 $126,456,546 $379,369,639 -3.5%
Revenue Differential $13,870,361
Table 5-10: Off-Peak Fare Reduction
5.6 Conclusion
Given the constraints of the public funding system and the difficulties in drawing large
numbers of new riders to an existing system, the goal of modest ridership recapture through
increased service provision and/or off-peak fare reductions appears reasonable for the CTA.
However, we have also seen there are at least two constraints - the mandated recovery ratio
and the CTA's aversion to mode- or time-specific fares - that may be preventing positive
strategies from being pursued. We now turn in Chapter Six to an examination of the possible
benefits from the investments and expenditures described in this chapter, and also a more
detailed examination of the possible time evolution of such a project.
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Goal: Annua l Percent Increase 1.6%
Current Bus Mode Share 67%
Share of New Trips By Bus 67%
Annual % Increase in Bus Ridership 1.60%
Current Fraction of Bus Trips in the Peak 48%
Share of New Bus Trips During Peak 48%
Off-Peak Bus Ridership Increase 1.60%
Peak Bus Ridership Increase 1.60%
Bus Peak-to-Base Ratio 1.9
Fraction of RVM During Peak Hours 49%
Off-Peak
Off-Peak Elasticity w.r.t. Bus Miles 0.68
Annual Increase in Off-Peak Bus RVM 2.4%
Current Total Bus RVM 68,000,000
Off-Peak Bus RVM 34,871,795
Year 1 Incremental Off-Peak Bus RVM 820,513
Operating Cost Per Bus RVM $7.21
Current Rail Mode Share
Share of New Trips By Rail
Annual % Increase in Rail Ridership
Current Fraction of Rail Trips in the Peak
Share of New Rail Trips During Peak
Off-Peak Rail Ridership Increase
Peak Rail Ridership Increase
Rail Peak-to-Base Ratio
Fraction of RCM During Peak Hours
Off-Peak
Off-Peak Elasticity w.r.t Car Miles
Annual Increase in Off-Peak Rail RCM
Current Total Rail RCM
Off-Peak Rail RCM
Year 1 Incremental Off-Peak Rail RCM
Operating Cost Per Rail RCM
Peak Peak
Peak Elasticity w.r.t. Bus Miles 0.5 Peak Elasticity w.r.t Car Miles 0.25
Annual Increase in Peak Bus RVM 3.2% Annual Increase in Peak Rail RCM 6.4%
Current Total Bus RVM 68,000,000 Current Total Rail RCM 65,600,000
Peak Bus RVM 33,128,205 Peak Rail RCM 35,088,372
Year 1 Incremental Peak Bus RVM 1,060,103 Year 1 Incremental Peak Rail RCM 2,245,656
Operating Cost Per Bus RVM $7.21 Operating Cost Per Rail RCM $3.54
Year 1 Peak Bus Operating Expense $ 74}A6 .?a l-Pekail OPeratin Epense $7,59503
Vehicles Operated in Maximum Service 1,719 Vehicles Operated in Maximum Service 1,020
Additional Peak Vehicles Required 55 Additional Peak Vehicles Required 65
Cost of New Bus $250,000 Cost of New Rail Vehicle $800,000
Capihal Cost for Year I Bits Expion$350ii x pkigon.. $5-2,000,00
Year 1 Ridership Increase 7,232,000
Average Fare Per Trip $0.87
Year 1 Revenue Generated $6,291,840
Year 1 Operating Expense $26,588,868
Required Year 1 Operating Subsidy $20,297,028
Marginal Recovery Ratio 24%
Table 5-11: Scenario I - "Constant Expansion"
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33%
33%
1.60%
48%
48%
1.60%
1.60%
2.3
53%
0.34
4.7%
65,600,000
30,511,628
1,435,841
$3.54
Current Rail Mode Share 33%Current Bus Mode Share 67%
Share of New Trips By Bus 80%
Annual % Increase in Bus Ridership 1.92%
Current Fraction of Bus Trips in the Peak 48%
Share of New Bus Trips During Peak 50%
Off-Peak Bus Ridership Increase 1.85%
Peak Bus Ridership Increase 2.00%
Bus Peak-to-Base Ratio 1.9
Fraction of RVM During Peak Hours 49%
Off-Peak
Off-Peak Elasticity w.r.t. Bus Miles 0.68
Annual Increase in Off-Peak Bus RVM 2.7%
Current Total Bus RVM 68,000,000
Off-Peak Bus RVM 34,871,795
Year 1 Incremental Off-Peak Bus RVM 946,746
Operating Cost Per Bus RVM $7.21.
Peak
Peak Elasticity w.r.t. Bus Miles 0.5
Annual Increase in Peak Bus RVM 4.0%
Current Total Bus RVM 68,000,000
Peak Bus RVM 33,128,205
Year 1 Incremental Peak Bus RVM 1,325,128
Operating Cost Per Bus RVM $7.21
Year 1 Peak Bus Operating Expense $0,55,§80
Vehicles Operated in Maximum Service 1,719
Additional Peak Vehicles Required 69
Cost of New Bus $250,000
Year 1 Ridership Increase 7,232,000
Average Fare Per Trip $0.87
Year 1 Revenue Generated $6,291,840
Year 1 Operating Expense $22,239,911
Required Year 1 Operating Subsidy $15,948,071
Marginal Recovery Ratio 28%
Table 5-12: Scenario II - "Targeted Investment"
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rr t ail ode Share
Share of New Trips By Rail
Annual % Increase in Rail Ridership
Current Fraction of Rail Trips in the Peak
Share of New Rail Trips During Peak
Off-Peak Rail Ridership Increase
Peak Rail Ridership Increase
Rail Peak-to-Base Ratio
Fraction of RCM During Peak Hours
Off-Peak
Off-Peak Elasticity w.r.t Car Miles
Annual Increase in Off-Peak Rail RCM
Current Total Rail RCM
Off-Peak Rail RCM
Year 1 Incremental Off-Peak Rail RCM
Operating Cost Per Rail RCM
Peak
Peak Elasticity w.r.t Car Miles
Annual Increase in Peak Rail RCM
Current Total Rail RCM
Peak Rail RCM
Year 1 Incremental Peak Rail RCM
Operating Cost Per Rail RCM
Year I Peak Rail Operating Expense
Vehicles Operated in Maximum Service
Additional Peak Vehicles Required
Cost of New Rail Vehicle
Goal: Annual Percent Increase 1.6%
48%
0%
1.85%
0.00%
2.3
53%
0.34
5.4%
65,600,000
30,511,628
1,656,740
$3.54
0.25
0.0%
65,600,000
35,088,372
0
$3.54
$0
1,020
0
$800,000
33%
20%
0.96%
Year 1 Operating
Subsidy (000)
Marginal
Recovery Ratio
Year 1 Bus Capital
Expenditure (000)
Base Described in text $20,297,028 23.7% $13,750,000
Demand Increase by 50% $11,434,072 35.5% $9,250,000
Elasticities Decrease by 50% $46,885,895 11.8% $27,500,000
Unit Costs Increase by 25% $26,944,244 18.9% $13,750,000
($/RVM) Decrease by 25% $13,649,811 31.6% $13,750,000
"Best Case" Elasticity Increase: 50% and $7,002,594 47.3% $9,250,000
____________ Unit Cost Decrease: 25% _________ __________________
Table 5-13: Sensitivity Analysis of Scenario I
Year 1 Operating Marginal Year 1 Bus CapitalDescription Subsidy (000) Recovery Ratio Expenditure (000)
Base Described in text $15,948,071 28.3% $17,250,000
Demand Increase by 50% $8,534,768 42.4% $11,500,000
Elasticities Decrease by 50% $38,187,983 14.1% $34,500,000
Unit Costs Increase by 25% $21,508,049 22.6% $17,250,000
($/RVM) Decrease by 25% $10,388,093 37.7% $17,250,000
"Best Case" Elasticity Increase: 25% and $7,052,107 47.2% $13,750,000Unit Cost Decrease: 25%ensiivityAnalysi of __cenariII
Table 5-14: Sensitivity Analysis of Scenario HI
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6 Ridership Growth II: Benefits
In Chapter Five, we identified a number of possible policy objectives as a justification for
"buying back" transit ridership. However, even a simple static analysis of one-period costs
made it clear that programs aimed at VMT reduction or reduction of household transportation
expenditures are likely to be very difficult to achieve given current travel patterns and the costs
associated with providing additional vehicle miles. However, a more limited goal of
incremental (above-baseline) ridership growth has more reasonable cost requirements in the
first year and is a candidate for a more extensive analysis of its benefits.
We concentrate in Chapter Six on evaluating the benefits that flow from the incremental
ridership our additional public funding has created. The universe of benefits is large, and
encompasses both direct benefits to transit riders and indirect benefits to travelers on other
modes and even non-travelers in the region. However, as in Chapter Four, we are concerned
with benefits in the three major categories that drive political decision-making: transit rider
mobility, congestion mitigation, and air quality.
6.1 Estimation of Benefits
In Chapter Four, we assessed a situation where an increase in funding would mitigate the
need for fare increases and prevent a shift of transit riders towards the automobile, causing
increased regional VMT. Here, the additional funding serves to draw riders away from the
automobile, reducing VMT from its baseline, and also improves the mobility of existing transit
riders.
6.1.1 Reduced Vehicle Miles
The "Targeted Investment" scenario described in Chapter Five envisions an annual increase
(over baseline) in transit trips of 7.2 million. Table 6-1, using previous assumptions regarding
mode share and trip length, shows that this is likely to result in a reduction in vehicle miles
traveled of approximately 48,000 per day. In a region the size of Chicago, this reduction is quite
small, amounting to a reduction of only .05%.
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Table 6-1: Change in Regional Automobile VMT
6.1.2 Congestion Mitigation
Because the change in automobile VMT is relatively small under the "Targeted Investment"
strategy, the impact on congestion mitigation is also modest. In addition, unlike in the baseline
scenario, we are proposing additional service provision, so we must also account for the
incremental bus vehicle miles that are being added to the roads (mostly on principal arterials) in
Chicago. Due to their size and slow acceleration, we assume (for congestion modeling) that
each bus mile traveled is equivalent to three automobile miles traveled. Thus, the addition of
over two million annual bus revenue miles approximately halves the congestion benefits that
arise from the targeted investment. Table 6-2 shows an estimation of the value of such
mitigation in 2005. While it is slightly positive, it is doubtful, given the uncertainty associated
with such modeling, that we can say with confidence that the benefits are significantly different
from zero.
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Increase in Unlinked Transit Trips 7,232,000
Average Unlinked Trips Per Linked O-D Trip 1.5
Increase in Linked Transit Trips 4,821,333
Fraction of Trips Shifting From Incremental Auto 50%
Reduced Auto Trips 2,410,667
Days Per Year* 250
Reduced Daily Auto Trips 9,643
Average Trip Length (mi.) 5
Incremental Daily VMT Change -48,213
Original Projected Daily Highway and Principal 95,840,000
Arterial VMT in Chicago Region
Incremental VMT Change -0.05%
* Assume all trip shifts occur on standard work days.
Table 6-2: Congestion Mitigation Benefits
6.1.3 Air Quality Improvements
As with congestion, the air quality benefits that accompany the increased ridership from the
targeted investment are reduced because of the additional bus miles that are required.
McCubbin and Delucchi (see Chapter Three) estimate that the average heavy duty diesel vehicle
(such as a standard transit bus) has health costs due to particulate matter that are nearly ten
times greater than the average gasoline vehicle. Thus, the projected twelve million mile
reduction in automobile VMT is offset by the 2.2 million increase in diesel bus VMT (see Table
6-3). Again, we cannot say with confidence that the combination of the increased transit
provision and reduced automobile usage will have a significant positive or negative effect.
However, a move to "clean diesel" fuel or buses powered by compressed natural gas (CNG)
might provide a way to mitigate some of the negative effects of increased bus service.
Change in automobile VMT (12,053,333)
Estimated Average Improvement Over 1990 Levels 50%
Change in Auto Pollution Costs ($5,599,682)
Change in bus VMT 2,271,874
Estimated Average Improvement Over 1990 Levels 50%
Change in Bus Pollution Costs $7,372,204
Net Change in Pollution Costs $1,772,523
Table 6-3: Air Quality Impacts
6.1.4 Transit Rider Benefits
The majority of the benefits from increased service provision accrue to existing and new
transit riders. Table 6-4 and Table 6-5 below show calculations for the estimated benefits. We
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all $ figures in millions 2004 2005
Projected highway/arterial VMT (000) 94,891 95,840
Congestion cost (2001) $4,359.6 $4,452.2
Change in auto VMT from baseline (48,213)
Change in bus VMT 9,087
Auto equivalent (x3) 27,262
New proj highway/arterial VMT (000) 95,819
New congestion cost (2001) $4,450.1
Change in congestion cost (2001) ($2.0)
Change in congestion cost (2004) ($2.1)
assume that there is no reduction in in-vehicle travel time for rail transit, and that any
reductions in in-vehicle travel time for bus (which might occur because time spent per bus trip
for boarding and alighting of passengers is reduced) are negligible. (Moreover, out-of-vehicle
time is generally perceived by riders to be more costly than waiting time, often by a factor of
two.) Thus, the benefits to riders come from increased frequency of service across the network.
On busy routes, there could also be benefits in improved comfort level (e.g., greater likelihood
of getting a seat), but we have omitted those benefits in this estimation. Combining the results
from these two tables, we estimate total benefits to existing riders of approximately $21.2
million. Using the 'rule of one-half' (assuming a linear demand curve), we then estimate
additional benefits to those new riders of $0.2 million, for a total of $21.4 million.
Original Ridership Peak Off-Peak Total
Bus 144,639,840 156,693,160 301,333,000
Rail 72,320,160 78,346,840 150,667,000
Percentage Increase Peak Off-Peak
Bus 2.00% 1.85%
Rail 0.00% 1.85%
Ridership Gains Peak Off-Peak Total
Bus 2,892,797 2,892,797 5,786,000
Rail 0 1,446,403 1,446,000
7,232,000
Table 64: Ridership Changes by Mode and Period
These benefits are clearly significant for transit riders, yet they are somewhat lower than
might have been expected. This is because Chicago already possesses a transit system with
relatively good frequency, though of course not as high as in the past (especially for buses).
That is, as headways decrease, a given percentage improvement in the headway brings a
smaller per-minute benefit to the rider. We have also modeled these improvements as being
spread equally across the network. In reality, some routes would probably see no changes
while other routes would see greater investment. On low-frequency routes, the improvements
in frequency would bring greater waiting time benefits, while on very high-demand routes,
improvements in comfort might be a result. For a strategic evaluation such as this, however, we
believe this provides a good order-of-magnitude estimation.
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Assumed average hourly wage $19.00 (from BLS 2003for Chicago PMSA)
Wage rate per minute $0.32
Peak Benefits
Bus Rail
Increase in bus vehicle miles (%) 4.0% Increase in rail vehicle miles (%) 0.0%
Implied reduction in headway 3.8% Implied reduction in headway 0.0%
Average peak headway (min) 7.5 Average peak headway (min) 5
Waiting time saved (reduction 0.14 Waiting time saved (reduction 0.00
times one-half headway) times one-half headway)
Valuation of waiting time (% of 100% Valuation of waiting time (% of 100%
wage rate) wage rate)
Per-rider benefit $0.046 Per-rider benefit $0.00
Off-Peak Benefits
Bus Rail
Increase in bus vehicle miles (%) 2.7% Increase in rail vehicle miles (%) 5.4%
Implied reduction in headway 2.6% Implied reduction in headway 5.2%(%) (%)
Average off-peak headway (min) 15 Average off-peak headway (min) 7.5
Waiting time saved (reduction 0.20 Waiting time saved (reduction 0.19
times one-half headway) times one-half headway)
Valuation of waiting time (% of 100% Valuation of waiting time (% of 100%
wage rate) wage rate)
Per-rider benefit $0.063 Per-rider benefit $0.061
Table 6-5: Benefits of Increased Service Provision
6.1.5 Summation
When we combine the congestion, air quality, and mobility benefits of the targeted
investment, we find a total one-year benefit of approximately $21.8 million accruing to riders
and the region. Returning to the cost estimation results in Chapter Five, we found that the
"Targeted Investment" scenario required an increased annual public operating subsidy of $15.9
million, as well as an initial capital investment (for buses) of $17.3 million. However, we cannot
simply sum all these costs and benefits (along with the cost of public funding) and use that to
make a policy judgment. This would fail to account for potential time lags in behavior, and it
would also ignore the valuable multi-period aspects of a capital asset such as a bus. In the next
section, we take these results and apply them more realistically across a multi-period
timeframe.
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6.2 Multi-Period Evaluation
6.2.1 Changes to the Model
Rather than a simplistic one year scenario, we now expand the horizon of our analysis to
five years. We will model an effort by the CTA to expand service starting in 2005 in order to
raise ridership by 1.6% and then maintain that added ridership through 2009. This will allow us
to make two key changes to the analysis.
First, it is unrealistic to assume that the benefits which accompany an increase in service
provision will occur immediately (i.e., within the period when the new service is started). A
number of factors may be at work here, for both riders and the agency. It takes time for
knowledge of the changes to filter through to the riding public, and then additional time for
those riders to respond and change their trip-making behavior. At the agency level, the CTA
will have to spend operating funds to hire and train new drivers and to modify timetables
and/or routes prior to putting the new service on the road. For existing riders, we will assume
that 75% of their benefits are realized in the first year and that the full measure is realized in the
second and following years. This same 75% time lag factor will therefore apply to the
congestion and air quality dis-benefits that accompany the additional bus service. Benefits to
new riders, as well as the positive effects of changes in automobile VMT, are assumed to ramp
up at a slower rate as new riders are attracted to the service. We assume that only 50% of those
benefits are realized in the first year, and the full amount is realized in all following years.
These assumptions will have a dampening effect on the net value of the investment scenario.
Second, the long-lived nature of a capital asset such as a bus must be recognized. Given the
bonding capability of the RTA and the State of Illinois, it is reasonable to suggest that the bus
purchase could be financed through borrowing and then paid off over the life of the vehicle.
Therefore, we model a scenario where the buses are financed at a 5% rate over a ten year vehicle
lifetime with equal payments in each period. (For the sake of conservatism, this is a somewhat
higher rate than current five-year A-rated municipal bonds.) At the end of the five year analysis
period, we have two options for dealing with the buses, which still have both significant value
to the CTA and financing to be covered. If the value of the ridership generation is negative, we
assume that project can be "cancelled" and that the buses can be shifted to other parts of the
system to replace older buses already scheduled for retirement and replacement. If the value of
the ridership generation is positive, then we continue charging the bus costs to this project, and
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calculate a terminal value for continuing the incremental service an additional five years until
the end of the bus life.
6.2.2 Results
Using the same assumptions as above, and assuming that real operating costs and revenues
remain constant, the expected net benefits are modestly negative for this service expansion.
Table 6-6 shows the net present value calculation for the five-year time horizon, assuming a
discount rate of 7% as discussed in Chapter Three. The slow ramp-up of ridership benefits
causes large negative net benefits in the first year, and then the relatively high operating
subsidy (and the additional inefficiency loss due to public funding) results in slightly negative
net benefits even in the "out" years. The total NPV is approximately -$12.2 million.
(allfigures in millions) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Operating Subsidy $15.9 $15.9 $15.9 $15.9 $15.9
Capital Financing $2.2 $2.2 $2.2 $2.2 $2.2
Public Funds Cost $4.7 $4.7 $4.7 $4.7 $4.7
Total Costs $22.9 $22.9 $22.9 $22.9 $22.9
Consumer Benefits $13.7 $21.8 $21.8 $21.8 $21.8
Net Benefits ($9.2) ($1.1) ($1.1) ($1.1) ($1.1)
Discounted Value ($8.6) ($1.0) ($0.9) ($0.9) ($0.8)
NPV ($12.2)
Table 6-6: Multi-Period Costs and Benefits of Expansion
However, the previous analysis assumes that the average auto trip removed from the
system had a length of five miles. Table 6-7 below shows a brief sensitivity analysis on that
variable. If the CTA were able, through skillful provision of the increased service, to draw
slightly longer trips into the system, then the net value of this service expansion appears to be
approximately break-even. Since we have attempted to be conservative in estimating the
benefits of the expansion, such an expansion could at least be seriously argued in the public
arena.
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Table 6-7: NPV (in millions) of Targeted Expansion (Five Years Only)
Moreover, the possibility of reduced operating costs holds the key to this service expansion.
If we are able to reduce unit operating costs by 25%, as shown in the sensitivity analysis of
Chapter Five, then the expected NPV of the expansion project becomes strongly positive at
$33.7 million (Table 6-8). The net benefits are still negative in the first year, but become positive
in all of the out years. Moreover, there are additional benefits to be gained by continuing to use
the new buses on this incremental service improvement for a second five years.
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Terminal
Operating Subsidy $10.4 $10.4 $10.4 $10.4 $10.4
Capital Financing $2.2 $2.2 $2.2 $2.2 $2.2
Public Funds Cost $3.3 $3.3 $3.3 $3.3 $3.3
Total Costs $15.9 $15.9 $15.9 $15.9 $15.9
Consumer Benefits $13.7 $21.8 $21.8 $21.8 $21.8
Net Benefits ($2.2) $5.9 $5.9 $5.9 $5.9 $25.8
Discounted Value ($2.1) $5.1 $4.8 $4.5 $4.2 $17.2
NPV $33.7
Table 6-8: Multi-Period Costs and Benefits (25% Unit Cost Reduction)
If this level of cost reduction can be achieved, then the benefits of this expansion will be
robust even to the shifts in average trip length described above. As Table 6-9 shows, even if the
CTA were to draw predominately very short trips into the system with its new service, the
lower cost structure makes this a justifiable project.
Average Length of Shifted Trip (mi)
3 5 7
$6.2 $33.7 $61.2
Table 6-9: NPV (in millions) of Targeted Expansion (Five Years Plus Terminal Value)
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Average Length of Shifted Trip (mi)
3 5 7
($27.4) ($12.2) $3.0
6.3 Conclusion
Benefits to current users dominate in the targeted expansion scenario, though there are
congestion mitigation benefits, and net air quality benefits would likely exist if CNG or clean
diesel buses were used. Using a net present value analysis over a five year time horizon, we
find that the expected result of the expansion would have slightly negative net benefits to
Chicago, although the result is essentially break-even if the CTA can draw longer trips into the
system. In addition, if the CTA's internal measures of performance could improve, then sizable
external benefits of such an expansion could be realized. If significant - but not unreasonable -
cost reductions could be implemented on the new service, then the expansion would show
robustly positive net benefits. We discuss the policy implications of this result in the final
chapter.
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7 Conclusions and Future Research
After assessing the past and present environment for transit in Chicago and determining a
framework for modeling potential changes to public transportation funding within that
environment, we analyzed the costs and benefits of (1) maintaining baseline ridership on the
CTA and (2) achieving incremental growth in ridership. Now, we want to summarize the
policy implications from those analyses and also describe future areas of research that need to
be explored in order to expand on the work in this thesis.
7.1 Review of Findings and Policy Recommendations
The policy recommendations arising from this analysis are summarized in three areas -
dealing with the immediate future, generating additional ridership, and considering changes to
the fare structure
7.1.1 Immediate Future
The analysis in Chapter Four indicates strongly that the RTA and the State of Illinois should
not allow the CTA to fall into a financial crisis by rigidly following policy constraints and
leaving current funding structures unchanged. Historical experience shows that ridership loss
is likely to be high, and the costs of this crisis - in both lost ridership and reduced mobility for
existing riders - are significantly larger than the additional funding needed to avoid it.
Raising the additional public subsidy via taxation is, in principle, a straightforward political
problem, though of course it would encounter serious opposition in some quarters. However,
one other significant policy constraint will also need to be changed. Such a direct infusion of
funding in order to simply maintain fares and ridership would violate the 50% farebox recovery
ratio requirement, despite its positive net benefits. As noted earlier, this constraint was a well-
intentioned effort at guaranteeing cost-efficiency at the CTA, but it is now having perverse
effects by enforcing a downward spiral of fare increases and service cuts. As part of a larger
political package (which should include dealing actively with growing paratransit
expenditures), the mandated recovery ratio should be reduced or eliminated. This
recommendation applies to all the scenarios described here. (See next section on 'Future
Research' for a follow-up.)
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7.1.2 Ridership Generation
While the analysis for "holding the line" in the near term is clear-cut, the prospects for
increasing ridership through agency action in the future are slightly more ambiguous. As the
discussion in Chapter Five showed, larger societal goals such as diversion of incremental VMT
growth into transit are extremely optimistic given the size of the Chicago region. A more
limited strategy of slowly increasing ridership back to previous levels, however, appears
initially promising. And yet the net benefits of a service expansion - even one targeted at buses
and off-peak ridership - are slightly below break-even, given the high unit costs of the CTA as
described in Chapter Six.
Yet the analysis does indicate a number of opportunities for changes that might turn an
expansion into a net positive project. A minor one is the introduction of "clean diesel" fuel or
CNG-powered buses, as the positive impacts of reduced auto VMT are currently mitigated by
the particulate emissions of a standard diesel transit bus. A somewhat larger opportunity
comes through the source of taxation used to fund the expansion. The cost of public funds
associated with a sales tax is relatively large. If the expansion were funded through a tax on a
less elastic transportation good, such as vehicle registration or a parking tax, the public costs
would be lower and the net benefits of the expansion would be greater. Looking further into
the future, funding through a congestion charge (as has recently been implemented in London)
would introduce the least distortion of all, to say nothing of the significant benefits such a
change could have on congestion costs.
The greatest opportunity lies in reducing operating expenses, as shown in Chapter Six. A
25% reduction in cost per revenue mile turns the targeted expansion into a significantly positive
project, and one which is robust even to variability in average trip length. Since the major
operating cost factor is (highly unionized) labor, such a change would require political skill and
a willingness to make fairly radical changes. The likelihood of achieving wage reductions
across the labor force, given the federal 13(c) labor protections and the political strength of the
unions in Chicago, is minimal. However, if the choice is presented as being between no
expansion (or even slow contraction) and a job-creating expansion with different contract terms
for the new drivers, then it might find acceptance. In practice, this would likely involve the
contracting out of some low-demand routes to an independent operator with a lower wage
structure, and then a redeployment of the existing vehicles and drivers to the rest of the
network.
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7.1.3 Fare Structure
We explored the possibility of changes to the fare structure in order to capture ridership in
Chapter Five. If the agency is simply interested in increasing ridership, then an off-peak fare
discount may actually be a more financially feasible approach, since it requires a lower
operating subsidy and no capital expenditures. Though we did not investigate it here, there is
also the option to differentiate fares according to mode, as is done in Boston and other cities.
The move at Chicago, as at many agencies, towards multifunction "smart cards" makes
implementation of such fare structure changes much simpler. In addition, by inducing some
marginal peak riders to shift into the shoulders of the peak, the capacity of the system is better
utilized and room opens up for future growth in peak ridership.
However, there are practicalities that argue against fare changes as a method for increasing
ridership. First, the CTA has long had a policy in favor of fare simplicity and against
differentiation by mode or period. Second, the policy arguments for simultaneously loosening
the recovery ratio and reducing standard fares will be difficult to sell to many constituencies in
Illinois. Finally, and most importantly, fare changes and reductions are good for one-time
ridership boosts, but they will lose their potency rather quickly. That is, it is difficult to
continually ratchet down fares in order to grow ridership. Service expansion, conversely, could
continue in year-over-year fashion as long as the expected discounted benefits of each
expansion were positive.
At the time of the completion of this thesis (June 2004), awareness of the financial crisis at
CTA is growing in both the Illinois state legislature and in the general public. It appears
possible that the CTA will receive some financial relief, but it will likely be insufficient to both
maintain fares and increase service. This might be an opportune moment, politically, to
introduce the concept of fare differentiation. A likely combination, for example, would put a
higher fare on peak-hour rail service, and the lowest fare on off-peak or weekend bus service.
Extra revenue generated from this pricing scheme could then potentially be used to increase
service provision. However, a straightforward combination of the results from scenarios
described here would not be correct, as joint changes in fares and service would make the
consumer elasticity response more complicated to model.
7.2 Future Research
In this thesis, a number of research areas have been touched on, but require further study.
We highlight here three of the most interesting.
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7.2.1 Asymmetry of Rider Response
We have not explored deeply into the complex consumer behavior inherent in the decision
by a person or household to purchase an automobile. The cost structure of the automobile -
with high fixed or upfront costs and low marginal costs - creates a strong asymmetry in traveler
behavior vis-I-vis transit. As the CTA was losing 30% of its riders since the late 1970s in
response to declining service and increasing fares, many of these lost riders purchased
automobiles. And once the initial expenditure on that auto was made, the ability of the CTA to
recapture these riders - even by returning to previous levels of service quality and price - was
severely reduced.
Future research should examine this asymmetry more closely, with particular focus on two
areas. First, households do eventually have to replace automobiles. Especially for older
households whose children have grown or persons purposely choosing to move into dense,
transit-friendly neighborhoods, a study of the "threshold factors" for deciding not to purchase
another car and shift back to transit would be valuable. Second, the nascent "car-sharing"
movement (with firms such as Zipcar, Inc., which operates in Boston, Washington, and New
York) now has a number of years of experience and data on which to draw. One of the explicit
goals of car-sharing is to allow people to purchase car services on a more purely marginal basis.
A study of car-sharing users' behavior - with regard to transit, shared cars, taxis, and other
forms of transportation - could also provide constructive insights.
7.2.2 Local Goods and Multiplier Benefits
As noted earlier, the expenditures that households make on automobiles go predominately
to firms outside their region, and even outside the country. Transit operating expenditures,
conversely, go mostly towards labor, which is centered within the local economy. We have not
included any estimate of a multiplier effect of this shift in regional spending in response to an
increase in transit service provision. In the scenarios described here, we expect the impact to be
relatively small, since the ridership generated is also small. But for larger projects that have
been proposed for Chicago, such as the Circle Line, this impact could be significant, and
research into these effects will be useful in justifying such investments.
7.2.3 Performance-Based Funding
Previous suggestions at the CTA regarding performance-based funding mechanisms have
been given a relatively cool reception. However, while this thesis is proposing a relaxation or
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even elimination of the recovery ratio requirement, we also recognize the need for external
controls or incentives in order to enforce cost efficiency at the agency. Instead of a recovery
ratio, a funding mechanism at the RTA or state level that guaranteed a baseline level of funding
to the CTA (and Metra and Pace) and then offered additional discretionary monies in response
to demonstrated improvements in internal measures of service effectiveness might convince
legislators that a relaxation of the recovery ratio would not mean a return to the high labor
wage growth of the 1970s. Further study would be required to construct a set of indicators that
would simultaneously be meaningful, easy to understand, and robust to manipulation.
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